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Problem
The purpose of this study was to determine the 
effects selected tax reform and school finance proposals 
would have on the equalizing tendencies of state aid to 
Michigan school districts. The study focused on nine 
finance revisions as follows: The Tisch proposal which
would make 50 percent cuts in all real property values; 
the Siljander proposal which would make 60 percent cuts 
in the value of some classifications of real property; 
two variations of the Tisch and Siljander proposals
2
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which would specify even larger reductions in property 
values than the original proposals; two variations of 
the Siljander proposal which would place ceilings cn 
the amount of eligible state aid; and three alterna­
tive proposals which would not affect property values 
but would call for slight dollar increases in the state 
aid guarantee formula and/or removal of any designated 
mill-ceiling on state axd.
Data Collection, Methods, and Procedures
Data were collected for 5 30 school districts 
representing 99.8 percent of all public school students 
in grades K-12 in the State of Michigan for the 1977-78 
school year. Included for each school district was che 
tax rate and local per-pupil revenues; the total numbe: 
of pupils; the state equalized valuations \S.E.V.) per 
pupil for each political subdivision (.township, village, 
city) within each school district; and the amount of 
per-pupil stare aid (apportionment) paid to each school 
district. Additionally, the amount of assessed property 
values by property classification for each of 1,783 
political subdivisions in the State of Michigan for 
1977 was acquired.
The data collected for school systems and the 
data concerning property valuations were combined to 
reflect the property classifications within each school 
district. Subsequently, a computer simulation was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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performed applying each of nine finance revision schemes 
to the 1977-78 data.
The relationship between state equalized valua­
tions of property and state aid per pupil was determined 
by computing a Pearson product-moment-correlation 
coefficient for the 1977-78 data and each of the nine 
proposals being investigated to determine equalizing 
tendencies. A test of the difference between correla­
tion coefficients from two independent samples was per­
formed to determine statistical significance of each 
analysis compared to 1977-78 data. A power analysis of 
each proposal was performed to determine effect size 
and practical significance.
Major Findings 
The Tisch and Siljander proposals would signifi­
cantly reduce the equalizing effects of state aid to 
Michigan schools. Two variations of the Siljander pro­
posal which specified a ceiling on the amount of eligible 
state aid were not significantly different from the 
1977-78 finance method and could be substituted without 
changing the equalizing effects of state aid. At the 
same time, property tax reduction could be achieved.
No improvement in the equalizing effects of state 
aid to Michigan schools would be realized by adoption of 
any of the nine finance revision plans analyzed.
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Conclusions
Plans to reduce property taxes and make up for 
lost revenues by state sources decrease the equalizing 
effects of state aid except that shifts away from the 
property tax to other revenues can be carried out without 
damage to equalization if there is a ceiling on the 
amount of state aid permitted to the local school 
district. It appears that the larger the reduction in 
assessed valuations, the more damage that is done insofar 
as equalizing effects of state aid are concerned when 
the state makes up for lost revenues.
Slight increases in the amount: of state aid 
guaranteed in an equal yield formula does not improve 
equalization. Removing the ceiling on the number of 
mills eligible for state aid in a guaranteed equal yield 
formula does not result in improved equalizing tendencies 
of state aid.
The utilization of computer simulation is a 
valuable tool in decision making.
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C H A P T E R  I
INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, June 10, 197 8, California voters 
triggered a "tax-quake" felt across the nation (Time,
June 19, 1978, p. 13). Through an initiative entitled 
Proposition Thirteen, voters bypassed elected officials 
and amended the State Constitution by a two-to-one 
margin. Throuqh this amendment, property taxes were 
rolled back 57 percent, and barriers were erected to 
prevent major increases in state and local tax levies 
for years to come (U. S. News & World Report, June 19,
1978, p. 17).
In spite of grim predictions of closed schools 
and libraries, threats of mass layoffs, reduced fire and 
police protection, and abandonment of the old and the 
poor, the "tax rebellion" grew. This citizens' movement 
was described as a "tidal wave of tax revolt" and "the 
new gut issue in American politics" (Newsweek, June 19, 
1978, p. 20). Targets of the taxpayers' anger were state 
and local governments and spiraling property taxes which 
had soared as much as 300 percent in one year causing 
homeowners to fear loss of their homes (Nation's Business, 
July, 1978, pp. 21-22).
1
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The tax rebellion did not originate in 
California, however. Some Oregon schools were closed 
during the 1977-7 8 school year when voters refused to 
approve tax requests. Also during the 1977-7 8 school 
year, as many as forty-four Ohio schools claimed bank­
ruptcy and asked state permission to close until the 
next fiscal year (Newsweek, October 31, 1977, p. 111).
For nearly a year, witnesses from school 
districts across the state have been testifying 
in county court arguing that as long as schools 
depend on the whims of local taxpayers, the 
state cannot guarantee— as its constitution 
requires— equal educational opportunity for all 
school children. Many of the experts have 
recommended that school money be raised through 
sales or income taxes that are not fixed by 
local votes (p. Ill).
In Louisiana the owner of a $50,000 home already pays
no tax because of a drastic constitutional tax curb while
in Illinois the following was reported:
Seventy percent of the electorate— more 
than has voted in any Presidential election—  
came to the polls and defeated a school-district 
tax hike, a typical reaction against Illinois 
property taxes that are expected to reach five 
times their 1970 rate by 1980 (Newsweek, June 19,
1978, p. 28).
Some attribute the public's resistance to the use 
of property taxes for schools to the fact that "faith in 
public education is at a low ebb" (Maeroff, 1978, p. 379). 
Complaints such as "the more money they spend on schools 
the worse the schools get," and "instead of teaching 
remedial reading, they teach backpacking or other craftsy 
things," only serve to increase the impetus for property 
tax reform (Time, June 19, 1979, p. 20).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The difficulties in getting proper financing 
for the schools are inextricably bound up with 
some of the most pressing issues of the day.
Desegregation, the closing of neighborhood 
•schools suffering from falling enrollments, and 
the program mandates of state and federal govern­
ments all figure prominently in the public's 
resistance to paying more for schools (Maeroff,
1978).
Quick to capitalize on the new public attitude, 
tax propositions were placed on the November 19 78 ballots 
in twenty-six states. In Michigan three proposals to 
amend the constitution with respect to taxes were pre­
sented to the voters. These amendments concerned the 
financing of education, the taxation of property, and the 
total state and local tax burden as follows:
The Voucher Plan would totally change the 
method of financing education in Michigan by prohibiting 
the levy of property taxes for educational purposes and 
by requiring the Legislature to establish a program of 
general state taxation to support elementary and secondary 
education. All students would receive "vouchers" which 
they could use at the public or private schools of their 
choice.
The Tisch Proposal was a plan paralleling the 
California Proposition Thirteen inasmuch as it called for 
a sharp roll-back in property taxes. Authored by Robert 
Tisch, drain commissioner of Shiawassee County, this 
proposal would have reduced the maximum constitutional 
allowable property tax base from 50 percent to 25 percent 
of true cash value. This proposal would have also limited
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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increases in property assessments to no more than 2.5 
percent per year and would have limited the state income 
tax rate to 5.6 percent compared to the present 4.6 per­
cent. The Tisch Proposal did not ask for tax relief, 
rather one could argue that the intent was a tax shift 
since provisions were included for revenue make-up (Gast, 
1978).
The Headlee Tax Limitation Proposal dealt 
with the magnitude of state and local taxes; i.e., the 
total amount of state and local taxes that can be 
collected from the public is limited to a fixed propor­
tion of the Michigan personal income. As personal income 
increases, tax revenues can increase. This limitation 
does not include the value of new construction or improve­
ments, and assessments on an individual piece of property 
are not limited— rather it is the taxing unit such as the 
township or village that is limited. The Headlee plan 
also requires the state to pay the cost of any new man­
dated programs and requires that future bond obligations 
be approved by the electors.
Much confusion existed among the Michigan voters 
as to which of the three constitutional amendments, if 
any, would result in the desired economic relief or what 
unexpected, undesirable results might occur. Confusion 
also existed as to what would happen if all three pro­
posals should pass (Gast, 1978).
Nevertheless, on November 7, 19 78, voters in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Micniyan and throughout the nation overwhelmingly 
approved measures that called for holding the line on 
government spending and limited future tax increases 
while flatly rejecting more radical schemes. In 
Michigan, the Headlee Tax Amendment passed by a close 
margin, the Voucher Plan was defeated by a strong 3 to 1 
margin, and the Tisch proposal lost by a 3 to 2 margin. 
Michigan residents are not expected to feel any immediate 
effects of this amendment since taxes are not reduced 
and state spending is limited to its present percentage 
of state personal income, about 9.5 percent (Detroit 
Free Press, November 9, 1978, p. 1).
The final vote was barely in before disappointed 
individuals and special interest groups began to complain 
that the vote had been unfairly influenced by large 
expenditures made by the Michigan Education Association 
in the last days preceding the election. Plans were again 
being formulated to present tax reforms for the 1980 
election (HeraId-Palladium, November 7, 1978).
In April 1978 Mark D. Siljander, State Represen­
tative of the 42nd District in Michigan, introduced a 
resolution to the Legislature calling for an amendment 
to the state constitution (Siljander, 1978). The high­
lights of Siljander's resolution are as follows:
1. Reduce property taxes of residential and
agricultural and timber-cutover properties by 
60 percent. (This represents a change from 
assessing property at 50 percent of true cash 
value to 20 percent of true cash value. A13
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other property classifications remain at 50 
percent).
2. Limit assessment increases for all property 
taxes to 7 percent per year.
3. Equalize property by classification to elim­
inate current inequities.
4. Guarantee the State will make up losses to 
local governments and school districts.
Difference to be made up from the income 
tax and lottery monies.
5. Have a local control provision; even though
the State is required to make up the difference, 
local people will still have control over how 
to spend their monies.
6. Guarantee a minimum amount of state aid per 
pupil and end forced reliance on property taxes 
with resultant shift to local costs.
7. Give senior citizens and veterans tax breaks. 
Siljander's constitutional amendment was presented to the 
legislature, not the voters; and final action was not 
taken. Nevertheless, as with the other tax revision 
proposals, the Siljander amendment can be considered for 
adoption and implementation in the future.
State..tent of the Problem
The Headlee Amendment passed in November 19 7 8 
merely maintains the status quo without tax relief. 
Inasmuch as Michigan taxpayers are already facing 
problems such as inflation, reduction in pupil enrollment 
in schools, threat of recession, and the present heavy 
tax burden, it is expected that proposals such as the 
Tisch amendment and/or the Siljander amendment will 
reappear. There is no information available as to how
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Michigan system of equalization for school districts 
would be affected if a proposal such as the Tisch or 
Siljander amendment should be approved in the future, 
nor is there information available as to the possible 
effects of a change in the present formula for state aid. 
There is no information available as tc the probabilities 
of jeopardizing the gains which have already been made 
in eliminating the fiscal disparities among school 
districts as to wealth. There is no plan to correct any 
inequities in funding which could occur with the passage 
of one of these proposals.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine the 
effects selected tax reform and school finance proposals 
would have on the equalizing tendencies of state aid to 
Michigan School districts. In particular, this study 
focused on the various changes which school districts 
would experience if any of the following finance revision 
proposals should be adopted:
1. The Tisch proposal which would make an 
across-the-board 50 percent cut in all real property 
valuations.
2. The Siljander proposal which would make 60 
percent cuts in some classifications of real property 
valuations.
3. Variations in the Tisch and Siljander
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proposals which would specify even larger reductions in 
property valuations than the original proposals.
4. Two variations of the Siljander proposal 
which would place ceilings on the amount of eligible 
state aid.
5. Changes in the state aid formula to include 
slight dollar increases in the formula guarantee, and/or 
removal of any designated mill-ceiling.
Importance of the Study
It would be helpful to decision makers to have 
advance information with regard to any possible changes in 
school finance in Michigan. In school finance there are 
two kinds of equity: equity for the student and equity
for the taxpayer. Reduction in property taxes would be 
an immediate and welcome relief to taxpayers; but, if the 
adoption of an alternative plan of school finance were to 
create new and, perhaps, serious and unexpected problems, 
possibly negating the progress already made toward 
equalization of educational opportunity, voters and legis­
lators ought to have this information before being called 
upon to choose from among the alternatives avilable.
The approval of the Headlee tax limitation in 
November 1978 does not preclude the introduction of new 
tax reforms in the future. William H. Shaker (1978) , 
founder of Taxpayers United who authored the Headlee 
Amendment, has stated that shifting the funding of
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education from the property tax to other revenue sources 
would be compatible with the Headlee Amendment. However, 
such a shift would require voter approval under this 
amendment (p. 25). On the other hand, removal of the 
ceiling on the present equal-yield formula may be seen 
as a less radical alternative. The results of this study 
are seen as providing a helpful perspective with regard 
to the proposed tax reforms which may be considered in 
the State of Michigan in the future.
Theoretical Framework
Educational finance in the United States is not 
limited to the issue of how the necessary funds are to 
be collected— whether the money should be generated by 
property tax, sales tax, income tax, or some other 
method. Also at issue is how school funds are to be 
allocated to each school district within each state so 
as to assure that each child has an equal opportunity to 
be educated.
A universally accepted definition of "equal edu­
cational opportunity" does not exist. Rather, this 
concept has differing legal, financial, and philosophical 
definitions. A major contribution to the philosophical 
thinking about educational equality was undertaken in an 
extensive study by Wise (1968). His nine definitions pre­
sented here in condensed form are based on allocation of 
resources:
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The Negative Definition asserts only that the nature 
of a student's education should not depend upon 
where he lives within a state and what his 
parents' circumstances are- It does not specify 
the conditions of equality.
The Full-Opportunity Definition represents an ideal 
standard for equal opportunity. Every person is 
to be given full opportunity to develop his 
abilities to their limit. The fatal shortcoming 
is the limited educational resources which result 
in the impossibility of realization.
The Foundation Definition stipulates a satisfactory 
minimum offering, expressed in dollars to be 
spent, which shall be guaranteed to every pupil. 
When a locality cannot supply that minimum offer­
ing at the state-mandated tax rate, the state 
makes up the deficiency.
The Minimum Attainment Definition provides that
resources shall be allocated co every student 
until he reaches a specified level of achieve­
ment .
The Leveling Definition asserts that resources should 
be allocated in inverse proportion to students' 
ability. 3ased on the assumption that students 
should leave school with an equal chance of 
success, education is designed to compensate for 
the effect of cultural deprivation— termed 
"compensatory education."
The Competition Definition asserts that more able
students deserve more education— more access to 
society's scarce educational resources.
The Equal-Dollars-Per-Pupil Definition assumes that 
there is no reason for society to grant more to 
one individual than to another. Major short­
coming— it fails to take into account price-level 
differences and the effects of school size. To 
offer students of different ability similar 
amounts of resources as measured in dollars may, 
in fact, be to treat them unequally.
The Classification Definition calls for a categoriza­
tion of students on the basis of ability and 
interests (or creativity or condition, such as 
"blind"). This plan is premised on the general 
ideal of equal treatment of equals. No simple 
way to determine equality among classes is 
identified.
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The Maximum-Variance-Ratio Definition might necessitate 
the reallocation of a large percentage of current 
educational expenditures and curb local initiative. 
It might require that the maximum variation in 
average per-pupil expenditure be no more than two 
to one, or one-and-a-half to one, or one-and-a- 
third to one. Variation can be justified, to a 
certain degree, as an accommodation to price- 
level differences and differences in the economics 
of scale, (pp. 143-159)
Wise was concerned by the wide disparity in 
financing found in the nation's schools. He argues that 
school financing disparity might violate equal-protection 
principles, for "once the state undertook 'something,' it 
must be made available equally" (p. 187).
Levin's (1974) concept of equal educational 
opportunity is seen as an equal start for all children in 
the race of life with the outcomes depending on each 
individual's own efforts. Again, in this plan, the focal 
concern is the allocation of public funds. Levin 
advocates a statewide educational finance plan that 
would provide a compensatory differential for the dis­
advantaged (p. 27) .
James Coleman (1974) sees the mastery of basic 
competencies, or survival skills such as basic communica­
tion and problem solving, as the main purpose of educa­
tion, and that educational opportunity is unequal unless 
it serves that purpose for all learners. Coleman's 
emphasis is on "effects of schooling" rather than school 
resource imputs (pp. 16-25).
The subject of "equal educational opportunity"
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has been the subject of court litigation for many years.
In 1896 the Supreme Court ruled that "separate but equal" 
facilities were just (Hudains. 1970, p. 15). Fifty-eight 
years later, the Court reversed itself and said that 
separate educational facilities were "inherently unequal" 
and remedies must be framed with "all deliberate speed" 
to end segregation (Alexander, Corns, and McCann, 196 9, 
p. 645) .
In 1971, in another landmark decision, the 
California State Supreme Court ruled in Serrano v. Priest 
that the California school finance system was unconstitu­
tional because under that system the quality of a child's 
education depended upon the wealth of his parents or on 
the wealth of the district in which he lived. Additional 
court decisions concerning Serrano in 1974 and 1976 
affirmed that school expenditures cannot be based upon 
taxable wealth (Pincus, 1977, p. 174). As to remedy, the 
court suggested a choice of six "workable, practical, and 
feasible" methods:
1. Full state funding, with the imposition of a 
state-wide property tax;
2. Consolidation of the present 1,067 (California) 
school districts into about five hundred districts, 
with boundary realignments to equalize assessed 
valuations of real property among all school 
districts;
3. Retention of the present school district 
boundaries but the removal of commercial and 
industrial property from local taxation for 
school purposes and taxation of such property 
at the state level.
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4. School district power equalizing, which has as 
its essential ingredient the concept that 
school districts could choose to spend at 
different levels but for each level of expen­
diture chosen, the tax effort would be the same 
for each school district choosing such level 
whether it be a high-wealth or a low-wealth 
district;
5. Vouchers; and
6. Some combination of two or more of the above 
(Phelps & Smith, 1977, p. 22).
The Serrano decision has important implications for
Michigan as well as all other states who are striving to
provide an equitable finance system for education.
The interpretation the courts give concerning
what is and what is not equal educational opportunity has
had far reaching effects in every aspect of school
administration. In fact, Kurland (1968) believes that
courts today are making too many decisions that ought to
be made by the legislature:
My thesis, then, is an old one. The society that 
relies on its judiciary for the resolution of its 
fundamental social and economic problems has doomed 
itself to failure, (p. 51)
In 1973 Michigan adopted a state/local sharing
concept known as the "equal yield formula" in an attempt
to equalize revenues between rich and poor schools.
This concept provided that school districts should
receive equal dollars per pupil for equal millage effort
(Phelps, 1976, p. 12). Schools are financed by locally
levied property taxes, a portion of which are voted by
the property owners and a portion which is paid by state
aid— with only a small amount from federal funds.
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The state's share of total Michigan school costs 
in 1972-73 was about 45.2 percent and the state's share 
had decreased to about 4 2.5 by 197 5-76. At the same time, 
the local taxpayer's share had increased from 4 9.8 per­
cent in 1972-73 to about 53 percent in 1975-76. Federal 
aid made up the small difference (Crim, 1976, p. 31).
In assessing the results of the "equal yield" 
formula in Michigan after four years in operation, 
progress had been reported in striving for the goal of 
equalization, but some disparities still existed (Crim, 
1976, p. 31). Barikor (1976) confirmed that state 
direct aid had a significant equalizing effect while 
federal funds had no equalizing effects.
The issues facing financial planners and voters, 
therefore, include not only the method or methods by 
which sufficient funds may be collected, but how those 
funds will be allocated to provide necessary and desired 
services while striving for the sometimes undefined or 
poorly understood goal of "equal educational opportunity."
Delimitations
This study was delimited first to a consideration 
of the following finance-revision proposals which were 
present during 1978 in Michigan, and which might possibly 
reappear, to several variations of those proposals, and 
to changes in the state-aid formula:
First, the Tisch proposal which called for an 
across-the-board cut in property taxes by 50 percent.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 5
Real and personal property, under this plan, would be 
assessed at 25 percent of true cash value. In addition, 
the. Tisch proposal would permit the state to increase in­
come taxes by 1 percent and, with voter approval, would 
permit a second 1 percent income hike to support local 
schools (Herald-Palladium, July 10, 1978, p. 1).
Second, the Siljander proposal which (a) called for 
reduction of property taxes by 60 percent for some class­
ifications of property; (b) limited assessment increases 
for all property taxes by 7 percent per year; (c) equal­
ized property by classification to eliminate current in­
equities; (a) guaranteed that the state would make up 
losses to local government and school districts from 
income tax and lottery monies; (e) promised a local con­
trol provision; and (f) guaranteed a minimum amount of 
state aid per pupil (Dowagiac Daily News, April 5, 1978).
Third, changes in the state aid formula includ­
ing slight dollar increases in the formula guarantee 
and/or removal of any designated mill-ceiling.
This study was further delimited to an analysis 
of the equalization impact these proposals (and variations 
thereof) would have on the state as a whole, and the 5 30 
Michigan K-12 school districts in particular. Neither 
private schools nor post-secondary education was in­
cluded in this study. The 530 school districts studied 
constitute 99.8 percent of the state aid membership in 
Michigan. The remaining .2 percent of the students
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receiving state aid are in elementary school districts 
which are not included in the Michigan Department of 
Education Bulletin 1012— a publication which reports 
public school financial data— and these elementary dis­
tricts were therefore excluded from the study.
This study is limited to school financing for 
general fund expenditures for current operating and 
instructional purposes and does not include capital 
outlay.
The Headlee Amendment was not included as part 
of this study since it would not change the 19 7 8 method 
of property taxation and since the legislature had not 
yet defined its implementation.
Definitions
The following definitions for specialized 
terminology were used in this study:
Categoricals: State funding by category to
assist districts with special needs. The eleven major 
categoricals may be divided into two groups: (1) Special
District Needs— Intermediate School District; media 
centers; transportation; municipal overburden; capital 
outlay; and (2) Special Pupil Needs— special education; 
vocational education; compensatory education; reading 
support; community schools; alternative juvenile programs.
Circuit Breaker Concept: Tax relief provided
citizens who pay more than a certain percentage of their
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income in property taxes.
Equalization: The process of compensating for
differences in order to make equal; for example, the 
process of compensating for differences in school 
districts' ability to support education in order to 
achieve student equity and taxpayer equity (Goertz, 
Moskowitz, and Sinkin, 1978, p. 59).
Fiscal Capacity; The total economic resources 
available to a government for tax purposes (p. 60).
Fiscal Neutrality: A court-defined equity
standard in school finance which states that differences 
in expenditures per pupil cannot be related to local 
school district wealth.
Local Tax Revenue: The amount of property
taxes collected based on the total voted and nonvoted 
mills levied.
Mill: One-thousandth (.001) of SI or the amount
of tax required to produce $1 per $1,000 of state equalized 
valuation (S.E.V.).
Millage: The total number of mills levied in a
school district for tax purposes.
Progressive Tax: A tax that increases propor­
tionately more than income as the income level of the 
taxpayer increases. A high-income taxpayer will pay a 
larger percent of his income toward this tax than a low- 
income taxpayer.
Regressive Tax: A tax which results in a low-
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income taxpayer paying a larger percent of his income 
in taxes than a high-income taxpayer.
State Aid: Revenues appropriated by the State
out of state funds based on student membership.
State Equalized Valuation (S.E.V.): The measure
or amount of property value or tax base as calculated 
by the State Tax Commission. The Michigan Constitution 
presently limits the tax levy on property to no more than 
50 percent of true cash value. S.E.V. is the single tax 
base not only for school districts, but for all other 
local tax units of government— county, city, township, 
or village.
S.E.V. per Pupil: The state equalized valuation
divided by the total number of students enrolled in the 
district on the fourth Friday after Labor Day.
Total S.E.V. of the District
Total No. of students = S.E.V. per Pupil
in District/4th Friday
Simulation: The process of conducting experi­
ments on a model of a system in lieu of either (1) direct 
experimentation with the system itself; or (2) direct 
analytical solution of some problem associated with the 
system (Mize and Cox, 1968, p. 1) . The purpose of 
simulation is to understand the behavior of the system 
or to evaluate various strategies (within the limits 
imposed by a criterion or set of criteria) for the 
operation of the system (Shannon, 1975, p. 2) .
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Summary and Organization of the Study
In chapter I an introduction to the tax-revision 
movement was given, and a statement was made concerning 
the desirability and importance of advance information 
prior to the implementation of any possible change in 
school finance which might have an effect on the 
equalizing tendencies of state aid to Michigan school 
districts. The theoretical framework for "equal educa­
tional opportunity" was examined, delimitations were 
stated, and definitions of specialized terminology for 
this study were presented.
Chapter II presents a review of the literature 
concerning the historical background of school finance, 
studies in equalization research and school finance, 
the methodology used in studying equalization, and the 
use of simulation.
Chapter III presents the design of the study 
including the Michigan system of financing education.
The finance-revision proposals used in this study are 
explained, and the data-collection process along with 
the analysis which was done are described in some detail.
Chapter IV is a presentation of the data and the 
results of the statistical procedures. In chapter V 
conclusions are drawn from the data presented and 
recommendations are made for further study.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The first section of chapter II presents a 
brief historical look at the foundations of school 
finance in the United States. Secondly, research in the 
area of equalization of school funds at the state level 
is examined, and the methodology used to study equaliz­
ing efforts is outlined. Finally, support is given for 
the use of simulation studies in tax reform.
Brief Historical Background of School Finance
An examination of the historical calendar of the
development of school finance in the United States over
the last 200 years revealed progress through three
important stages:
A privilege under private auspices for those 
who could afford it; a privilege for all at public 
expense, regardless of ability to afford it; a 
right for all that must be provided equally 
without discrimination based upon race, sex, 
intellectual ability, or wealth of school districts. 
(Wynn, DeYoung, Wynn, 1977, p. 290).
The first efforts to impose general and direct
taxation for the support of schools in the United States
began about 1825. Permissive taxation of those who
consented had been the practice, and the attempt to pool
resources to provide free public education through
20
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compulsory district taxation was not accepted without a
struggle (Cubberly, 1929, p. 101).
Taxes on all property were mandated, regardless 
of consent and regardless of whether the property 
owners had children in school. The notion that 
one could be taxed to support the education of 
other people's children, although commonly 
accepted today, was a revolutionary doctrine at 
the time, both here and abroad (Wynn, DeYoung,
Wynn, 1977, p. 290).
During the nineteenth century "no integrated
plans of school finance were developed" and "no
conceptual theory of school finance was developed,"
(Johns and Morphet, 1975, p. 205). The concept of
state school support was first developed and published
by Cubberly in 19 05. As the "father of school
finance," his theories have dominated the twentieth
century thinking on school funding and are still
considered valid in 1979. With regard to equalization
of educational opportunity, Cubberly (1905) stated:
Theoretically all the children of the state are 
equally important and are entitled to have the 
same advantages; practically this can never be 
quite true. The duty of the state is . . .  to 
equalize the advantages to all as nearly as can 
be done with the resources at hand. (p. 17)
. . . Any attempt at the equalization of the
opportunities for education, much less any attempt 
at equalizing burdens, is clearly impossible 
under a system of exclusively local taxation.
(p. 54)
Cubberly's solution was that a state school tax would 
best equalize disparities, and the best measure for 
distributing funds would be the number of teachers 
employed (Johns, 1971, p. 5).
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In the two decades which followed Cubberly, 
other important theorists appeared who have had a 
profound effect on the shaping of school finance 
policies. Updegraff designed the first percentage 
equalizing plan in 1921. Under this plan, each school 
district chose the amount it wished to spend. The state 
then paid a certain percentage of those costs depending 
on the relative wealth of the district and the amount of 
money that the state was willing to commit to the aid 
program (Harrison, 1976, p. 10). Updegraff attempted 
to combine the concepts of equalization of educational 
opportunity and reward for effort within the same formula 
(Johns, Alexander, and Jordan, 1972, p. 7).
In 1923, Strayer and Haig developed one of 
the first "equalizing aid” formulas. Their plan, still 
used today, called for a determination of the follow­
ing :
1. The minimum cost per student necessary for an 
adequate education is estimated for the state.
2. The tax rate needed by the richest school 
system in the state to meet this cost is 
estimated.
3. All school systems within the state are 
required to tax at this rate to be eligible 
for any state aid.
4. The difference between the revenues that each
school system can generate with this tax rate,
and the revenues necessary to meet the 
minimum cost for an adequate education as 
determined by the state is computed. . . . The
state provides aid to make up the difference
in revenues, so each school district has the same 
minimum foundation upon which it can build its 
educational program. (Johns, 1971, p. 9)
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The Strayer-Haig plan was still found to be emphasized 
in thirty-three states in a study done by Thomas L. Johns 
in .1371-72 (Johns, 1972 , p. 5).
In 1924, one of Strayer's students, Paul R. Mort,
published a doctoral dissertation which advanced a concept
of a satisfactory "minimum state-assured program" (Johns
and Morphet, 1975, p. 213). His plan called for
. . . Objective, equitable measures of educational
need that could be used by a state legislature in 
determining the amount of state appropriation for 
equalization. He also wished his measure to be 
used by officials in the state department of 
education for apportioning state school funds 
with a minimum of state control, (p. 213)
More used complicated statistical regression 
equations to compute the number of "typical" teachers 
employed and finally the amount of state appropriations 
necessary for equalization. Many foundation programs 
today still use some form of the "weighted teacher" or 
"weighted pupil" measure particularly with respect to 
vocational and/or special education programs. Mort 
also proposed a concept of compensatory education fcr the 
disadvantaged, a concept commonly found in modern 
finance formulas (Johns and Morphet, 1975, pp. 213-214).
In 1930 Morrison envisioned full-funding by 
the state and federal governments. In his plan all 
local school districts would be eliminated and the state 
itself would become both the unit for taxation for 
schools and the administrator of the public schools.
This was not a popular idea in Morrison's time since
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local self-government was deemed almost equivalent to 
democracy itself (Johns, Alexander, Jordan, 1972, p. 13). 
Hawaii is the only state to date to adopt this plan 
(Harrison, 1976, p. 11).
The basic finance models described thus far were 
developed prior to or about 1930. Harrison (1976) 
summarized and classified the finance schemes which 
evolved through the years. Basically, there are three 
nonequalizing formulas all of which allocate state aid 
without regard to a locality's wealth or expenditures:
(1) uniform flat grants provide an equal amount of aid per 
student; (2) variable flac grants allocate more aid to 
areas with higher costs; and (3) complete state-federal 
funding is presently restricted to Hawaii (pp. 11, 47).
Again there are three basic types of equalizing 
aid plans which consider local taxpaying ability usually 
in inverse proportion to assessed property per student 
and directly or indirectly take into consideration local 
tax rates and expenditures: (1) Strayer-Haig-Mort or
minimum foundation plans guarantee each local school 
system a minimum level of per-student expenditures at a 
rate no higher than the richest school in the state to 
obtain the same revenues; (2) the percentage equalizing 
plan is based on local per-student expenditures multi­
plied by a ratio of local valuations to the statewide 
average; and (3) the guaranteed valuation or tax yield 
distributes aid as a function of local tax rates
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multiplied by the difference between the statewide 
average valuation and the local valuation (pp. 47-48).
From 1930-1970 education experienced tremendous 
growth in terms of money expended, number of students 
enrolled, and the type of services rendered. According 
to Johns, Alexander, and Jordan (1972), total expendi­
tures for public schools in the United States for 1930- 
1970 increased from $2,307,000,000 to $39,489,000,000, 
an increase of 1,612 percent. Converted into purchasing 
power of 1969 dollars, this increase in expenditure would 
represent an increase of 700 percent. For the same forty- 
year period, the average daily attendance increased 99 
percent and the average expenditure per pupil in uerms of 
1969 dollars increased 302 percent--from $233 to $936 per 
pupil (pp. 13-19).
Other factors identified by Johns and his 
associates as influencing education during the forty-year 
period from 1930 to 1970 were the industrialization of the 
nation; the mobility which resulted from the expanded 
availability of the automobile; the Great Depression and 
the opposition to property taxes during a time when many 
taxpayers had no income; World War II; accelerated tech­
nology; the "baby boom"; and increased ownership of prop­
erty and prosperity for much of the population (pp. 23-25).
The principle of free public education for all 
was firmly established by the middle of the twentieth 
century, and attention focused on questions of equity
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for students as well as the taxpayer. Whereas inequality 
of education was first seen as a racial problem with 
integration of the schools a possible solution, in­
equality of education was later seen as an additional 
problem of wealth with an imbalance of funding for rich 
and poor schools. In 1972 McKenna reported that assessed 
valuation per pupil in California ranged from $103 to 
$952,156, and the district with the lower assessed valua­
tion could never hope to raise an amount equal to the 
district with the higher assessed valuation no matter how 
high a tax rate was imposed (McKenna, 1972, pp. 171-173).
The increased discontent with property taxes was 
supported by the California Supreme Court in its 1971 
decision in Serrano v. Priest wherein the court ruled 
that a child's education was a fundamental right which 
could not depend on the wealth of his parents or the 
accident of his residence. The Court maintained that as a 
result of the California financing scheme, some parents 
were "required to pay a higher tax rate than taxpayers in 
many other school districts in order to obtain for their 
children the same or lesser educational opportunities" 
(Alexander, Corns, and McCann, 1975, p. 53). Furthermore, 
said the Court, there was no compelling reason for the 
then existing disparities in educational opportunity 
(pp. 51-65) . The search for an equitable financing plan 
in California was thus mandated by the Court and has had 
implications for other states attempting to provide equal
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educational opportunity to its students.
During the 1970s, twenty-five states enacted 
school finance reforms (Odden, 1978b, p. vii). The common 
denominator of these new programs was the effort to 
implement formulas which would distribute more state aid 
to elementary and secondary school districts low in 
property wealth and therefore low in ability to provide 
educational programs on a par with wealthier districts.
Odden (1978b) identified other characteristics of 
the reforms enacted in the 1970s as increased attention 
to special education, compensatory education, or 
bilingual-bicultural programs; recognition of the fiscal 
problems of many central city schools as well as poor, 
isolated rural areas— sparcity and density factors; 
increasing interest in an enactment of income factors as 
measures of wealth; cost-of-education adjustments to 
state aid; and finally, the use of tax and expenditure 
controls to stabilize property tax rates (pp. vii-ix).
As 1980 nears, the problems facing educators and 
the nation include the threat of a recession, growing 
inflation, and declining enrollments. The search for 
improved ways to finance education in the face of these 
challenges continues.
Equalization and School Finance Research
Research of primary interest as background for 
this study concerns the impact school funding plans 
may have had in providing a remedy for "historical
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inequities" (Odden, 1978a, p. 31) and relationships 
between school finance and state/local tax policies 
(p. 37) in equalizing educational opportunity.
Investigative studies of the 1960s identified 
determinants of local school district tax and expenditure 
policies to be socioeconomic factors such as property 
wealth per pupil, median family income, the percent un­
employed, etc. (Miner, 1963; Hickrod and Sabulao, 1969; 
Hickrod, 1971; Sacks, Ranney and Andrew, 1972). In 
addition, in 1968 the United States Office of Education 
funded the first comprehensive national study of school 
finance since 19 3 3 by underwriting the National Educa­
tional Finance Project for about $2,000,000. As a 
result, five volumes were produced analyzing the financ­
ing of education in all fifty states. One important 
conclusion was:
If a state finances its schools from a combina­
tion of state and local funds, it will achieve 
greater financial equalization from a given 
amount of state revenue if it utilizes the 
equalization plan of state financing and maximizes 
the required local effort within the legal tax 
limit of school districts which is included as a 
part of the total program equalized. (National 
Education Finance project, Volume 5, p. 2 51)
Scholars have made important contributions to the 
pool of knowledge about equalizing tendencies of various 
formulae within states. Hempstead (1970) computed pro­
jected costs to the State of Illinois of ten alternative 
state aid formulae. Correlations were then used between 
state aid per student and assessed valuation per student
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to compare equalization strengths of these ten formulae. 
Hempstead found that equalization is highly dependent on 
wealth as measured by local property valuations of a 
school district in Illinois. He noted that if another 
measure of wealth were used such as personal income, sales 
tax paid, and so forth, the results would have undoubtedly 
been different. Using assessed valuations, Hempstead 
found that the Strayer-Haig formulae produced the best re­
sults in terms of equalization within rural districts as 
opposed to urban districts suggesting that more monies than 
just equalization aid might be needed for urban schools.
Perea (1972) analyzed the equalization effects of 
twenty selected New Mexico school fund distributions 
relative to a fiscal capacity index of assessed valuation 
for each school district divided by the average daily 
membership during 196 8-6 9 and 196 9-70. During the 
196 8-6 9 school year a "weighted pupil" formula was in 
effect, but during the 1969-70 school year the legislature 
changed the formula to a "staffing" index. State aid 
distributions for both target years were found to be 
anti-equalizing to a statistically significant degree, 
with the "staffing" formula slightly less anti-equalizing. 
In contrast, Total Federal Revenue for the two target 
years revealed that Total Federal Funds had an equalizing 
effect which appeared somewhat inverse to the Total State 
distributions (Perea, 1972, p. 90). Perea recommended 
that an equalization dimension be incorporated into the
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state aid formula which might take into account the fiscal 
capacity of each district and be based upon the "equal­
ization principle." Furthermore, Perea charged that at 
worst state distributions should be non-equalizing rather 
than anti-equalizing, and he recommended that restructur­
ing steps be taken to eliminate the anti-equalizing 
effects (p. 90) .
Yang (1975) studied the degree to which school 
revenue equity had been improved by changing the state 
aid funding systems of Michigan, Illinois, and Kansas 
from foundation systems to power equalization systems 
in 197 3. Although the new financing plans were to be 
phased in over a period of from three to four years,
Yang's research sought to make a short-run analysis.
Yang sought to measure two variables: permissible
variance (a specific variation in level of expenditure 
per pupil) and fiscal neutrality. He used the magnitude 
of the coefficient of variance to determine the degree 
of improvement in revenue equity achieved through the 
new funding system. He also used the Gini Index and the 
Lorenz curve to investigate the disparity among school 
systems. Yang concluded that the three states did move 
toward various equity goals, including the goal of 
fiscal neutrality.
In another study conducted by Yang in 1976, he 
examined the relationship between operating tax rates and 
selected socioeconomic variables for Illinois school
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districts. School districts were separately ranked by 
operating tax rates and then divided into four equal 
quartiles— low tax effort, low medium tax effort, high 
medium tax effort, and high effort. Discriminant analysis 
was used to construct profiles for each group. Yang's 
results confirmed the belief that differences in fiscal 
capacity and educational aspirations contributed to 
differences in local tax effort.
Yang found that the school districts in the lowest 
quartile, low tax effort group, had a higher assessed 
valuation per average daily attendance than the other 
groups. The low tax effort group also had lower educa­
tional attainment and a higher number of low-income 
families in spite of the fact that the assessed valuation 
was close to the higher tax effort groups. Yang also 
found that there was higher educational attainment, a 
higher percent of professionals, and higher average income 
in the high tax effort group. He concluded that there 
was a conflict in the ideals of local control and equality 
of educational opportunity, and it was apparently not pos­
sible to accomplish the two goals of Strayer-Haig simulta­
neously; namely, stimulate the tax district to tax and 
spend more and reduce disparities between school districts.
Harrison (1976) conducted a massive study of all 
fifty states and one hundred of the largest metropolitan 
areas in the United States to look at the effects various 
fiscal policy methods had on inequality. His quest was to
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assess the relative effectiveness each method had in 
equalizing finances and to determine whether one means 
should have priority over the others, or if any should 
be de-emphasized.
Nine variables or funding policies were identi­
fied by Harrison: state aid, equalizing aid, federal 
aid, non-property taxes, full valuation, consolidation 
of school systems, independent school districts, removal 
of state ceilings on local property tax rates, and re­
placement of state ceilings on local debt (p. 37).
Harrison's findings indicated that state aid is 
typically the most reliable policy to reduce expenditure 
inequity. "Where there is little state aid, there is a 
lot of inequality" (p. 50). Harrison reported that the 
amount of aid available for distribution is a far more 
important factor shaping expenditure inequality than is 
the aid formula used to distribute the aid. In fact, he 
suggests that a statewide property tax might not be a bad 
idea (pp. 51-53).
The second most important policy affecting equality
according to Harrison is full valuation of local
property for tax assessments.
Places with higher assessment ratios have far less 
variation in expenditures among local school 
systems. In fact, the average assessment ratio 
is one of the most important determinants of 
expenditure inequality. Where there is full 
valuation, there is consistently less inequality.
Where there is fractional valuation, there is 
consistently more inequality. (p. 52)
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. . . Local governments can be encouraged, or
compelled, to value property at full sales price, 
and to avoid the distorting effects of fractional 
valuation, (p. 54)
Thirdly, Harrison recommends school district con­
solidation as particularly valuable for removing extreme 
differences in expenditures:
The reformer should also consider another tactic 
with respect to state aid. There is a negative 
correlation between the number of school systems 
in a state and the share of local school expendi­
tures financed by state aid. . . .  It may be that 
state officials feel more comfortable in dealing 
with countywide systems. Perhaps they feel they 
are more efficient, and therefore have greater 
claim on funding. . . . For whatever reasons, it
may be that to increase state aid, a good tactic 
may be enforced consolidation, (p. 53-55)
Barikor (1976) conducted research concerning the 
equalizing effects of state and federal funds in Michigan's 
K-12 school districts. He sought to determine the degree 
to which equalizing funds had accomplished their purpose. 
Barikor's study included 581 school districts in Michigan 
at that time. 3arikor used correlation techniques to 
compare the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) with 
three categories of funds— state direct appropriations, 
redistributed federal funds, and direct federal aid.
His findings substantiated that state direct aid had a 
significant equalizing effect while redistributed 
federal funds and federal direct funds had no equalizing 
effects on K-12 school districts in Michigan. Barikor 
found that for the year 1972-7 3 the correlation between 
the state direct appropriation and state equalized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
valuation was -.9 20 which indicated a very strong equal­
izing effect (-1.0 would be perfect equalization). For 
the year 197 3-74 the correlation was -.908; and for the 
year 1974-75 the correlation was -.816. The decreasing 
correlation coefficient from year to year might reflect 
increased property values with the accompanying reduction 
in state direct appropriation.
In 1976 Meek of the University of Michigan 
reported development of a prototype state model for fund­
ing public elementary and secondary school education. He 
called his federal-state-local partnership model "creative 
federalism" and conceptualized a design for "government 
interfaces." One of Meek's major recommendations was that 
the resources of the entire state should determine the 
quality of the student's education (fiscal neutrality) 
and less reliance should be placed upon the regressive 
local property tax as a source of educational revenue.
Beach (1977) addressed himself to a different 
perspective of the finance movement. He attempted to 
ascertain what trends were evolving from recent school 
finance reform efforts. Beach asked the chief school 
finance officer in forty-nine state departments of 
education to complete a questionnaire concerning whether 
or not a state school finance study committee was com­
missioned after 1971. Beach sought to determine the 
reasons why such committees were formed and what conclu­
sions were reached. Of the forty-nine states solicited,
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forty-one had in fact formed school finance study 
committees. Beach found that there was a trend toward 
statewide property tax; a trend toward improvements in 
local effort; a trend toward improved property tax 
administration; and a trend toward increased use of 
weighting by program and program-cost differentials.
Beach also noted that there was a trend or movement toward 
fiscal neutrality.
Walker (1977) compared six alternative finance 
models for equalization of educational revenues using 
1975-76 data for the public schools in Texas. He sought 
to ascertain the relative advantages of these six finance 
schemes and patterned his research design after one used 
by the National Education Finance Project (1969-1973). 
Walker ranked the 1,095 school districts in Texas and then 
selected fifty districts by systematic sample. Total 
revenue (state plus local) was held relatively constant 
for each of the six research models. The variances of 
total revenue per pupil in average daily attendance 
created by each finance model were compared for the fifty 
schools in the sample. The six finance models used were 
two types of flat grant plans, two different Strayer-Haig- 
Mort equalization models, a percentage equalization plan, 
and a district power equalization model. Walker's con­
clusions were that a district power equalization model 
was more equalizing than any other plan used in his 
study when applied to the disparate wealth of Texas
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school districts.
Hickrod (1978) reported on the results of three 
annual evaluations of the 197 3 reform in school funding 
in the State of Illinois. Although citing a number of 
limitations on the results of his study, he reported 
reduction in disparity between school district expendi­
ture per pupil and progress in "moving up the low- 
spending unit districts and high school districts, but 
there appears to be no such progress for low-spending 
elementary districts" (P. 78).
Hickrod identified a number of variables that he 
described as "crucial" in assessing the 197 3 Illinois 
finance reform plan. First, the simple unweighted pupil 
count which he referred to as "the warm body orientation" 
is used by most states in measuring school district 
wealth. If districts lose pupils they also lose state 
aid. Loses are not uniform throughout the state, and a 
school experiencing considerable loss of students would 
also experience considerable loss of aid. This would 
obviously affect "equalization" effects.
The second variable described by Hickrod concerned
the number of pupils eligible for Title I benefits. This
source of educational aid was named as
. . . the most important aspect of Illinois aid
to central-city school districts and it also delivers 
state funds into pockets of rural poverty, mostly in 
the extreme southern part of the state, (p. 65)
Linking a state definition of poverty children to the
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federal definition of poverty resulted in unintended 
changes in state fund distribution according to Hickrod.
The third variable of importance in evaluating 
the 1973 Illinois finance reform was property valuations 
per pupil. Although this had been the traditional, 
accepted measurement of school district wealth in 
Illinois, Hickrod discussed the combination of property 
valuation and income used by some other states. Lack 
of annual income data has been advanced as a reason for 
failing to consider income as a factor in an aid formula 
in Illinois; however, Hickrod suggests that income- 
wealthy schools with sufficient political clout see the 
inclusion of an income factor in the general aid formula 
as threatening to them. Nevertheless, Hickrod cites 
factor analysis research in other states by Hanes and 
Jordan (1976) and Firestine (1976) which showed that 
the property valuation variable was not closely associated 
with either income or income-related variables (p. 67).
The fourth variable specified by Hickrod as 
possibly important to an analysis of the 1973 Illinois 
finance reform results was the local tax rate for operat­
ing purposes, a new factor in Illinois since 1973. 
Supposedly this tax rate represents "local effort" but 
Hickrod believed that "effort" cannot really be measured 
without also specifying "ability to pay" or "wealth. "
"If income is desirable in a wealth measurement, it is 
just as desirable in an effort measurement" (p. 70).
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While suspending judgment until more data is available on
tax rate change in Illinois, Hickrod noted that other
research confirms such a relationship. Johns and
Kimbrough (1968) reported that there was a positive
relationship between income and tax effort with poorer
districts exerting lower effort and richer districts
exerting greater effort. This position has found support
from other researchers as well (Alexander, 1975; Rasanond,
1976). The opposing point of view also has support.
A district with a very limited tax base can raise 
relatively little revenue even at confiscatory 
tax rates, while a district with a large tax 
base can raise substantial amounts of revenues 
by levying a very modest tax rate. (National 
Educational Finance Project, Volume 5, 1971, 
p. 60)
Furthermore, Furst (1974) pointed out that dis­
tricts with low assessed valuation may in many cases have 
greater financial needs than districts which are relatively 
wealthier. "Yet the poorer districts have less tax base 
from which it can derive funds to support its schools"
(p. 13). Concurring with the position that poor school 
districts may be making greater "effort" without achieving 
results equal to wealthier schools are Cohen (1969) and 
McKenna (1972).
The question of how to determine the "wealth" 
of a school district to arrive at a means of equity 
for the taxpayer and the student is another dimension 
pursued by researchers. Carr (1977) explored the use 
of an alternative "wealth tax" source in lieu of
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the personal income tax and could provide relief from 
real property tax while at the same time adequately 
funding education in the State of Florida. Carr proposed 
a "wealth" tax similar to that used in Europe whereby 
forms of wealth which would otherwise avoid taxation 
would be tapped. A wealth tax has never been used in the 
United States. This plan was said to be constitutionally 
legal in Florida, and Carr found that a 1 percent 
wealth tax over the total wealth of the State of Florida 
in 1974-75 would have produced enough revenue to adequately 
finance education and equal or surpass the national 
average educational expenditure level.
McMahon (19 78) also developed a theme that inequal­
ity in expenditure per child and inequity for the taxpayer 
were aggravated by the narrow definition of wealth based 
only on property wealth that is used in most states to 
measure both local ability-to-pay and local effort. 
McMahon's proposed solution was to broaden the measures 
of wealth and effort to include human capital wealth 
(salary income) and financial wealth (interest income, 
dividend income, and capital gains). In addition:
State aid based on equal 'effective tax rates' 
among districts at any given level of wealth . . .
would be conducive to horizontal equity, or equal 
treatment of equals, (p. 85)
McMahon defines horizontal inequity as a situation 
where two taxpayers who have the same ability-to-pay as 
measured by their income and wealth, and who live in 
different school districts, pay widely different amounts
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in school taxes. A broadened measure of wealth and use 
of the effective tax rate would target aid better to the 
low expenditure per pupil district which also tends to be 
low income, low ability-to-pay, and "who in fact are now 
making the largest effort" (p. 85). These low fiscal 
capacity districts are of major concern to McMahon since 
he points out that society must bear the costs later when 
education in these districts is inadequate. McMahon 
further maintains that the use of an income factor in the 
school aid formula as a part of the measure of well being 
or of effort can be considered wholly apart from the 
question of whether school districts should or do have the 
power to tax income (p. 87).
The role of the property tax use or nonuse in
equalizing aid to public schools is by no means clear
according to Harrison (1976) since some property-poor
areas may be rich in personal wealth and be able to pay
high taxes (pp. 4-7).
Everyone dislikes the property tax until the 
alternatives are considered. Low-income taxpayers 
(and their representatives, especially labor unions) 
will not readily accept a value-added tax or a sub­
stantial increase in sales taxes to finance property 
tax relief, while upper-income taxpayers will be 
resistant to accept large increases in the income 
tax, particularly where rates are graduated. (Paul, 
1975, p. 3)
Others point out that a major advantage of a tax on 
property is that it cannot be easily moved to escape 
taxation (Johns, Alexander, Jordan, 1972, p. 84).
Harold Groves (1973) suggests that property tax is
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about proportional to income:
A standing complaint against the property tax on 
housing is that it is highly regressive in 
distribution, but recent evidence and analysis 
have cast doubts on this conventional wisdom. . . . 
the new evidence poses the possibility that for 
income classes of a lifetime income, differences 
in burden over most of the income scale may 
pretty well average out. Of course, this is the 
very long run in which we are all dead. (Cited by 
Paul, 1975, p. 20)
Furthermore, many kinds of property are tax
exempt with some types of exempt capital being owned
primarily by those in upper-income brackets:
All property owned by the following: federal,
state and local governments; much owned by churches, 
private schools, and charitable organizations; 
considerable business inventory and equipment; 
in some states part of the value of homes generally 
or homes belonging to veterans, the elderly, or 
other groups; and in a few states public utility 
property and non-business tangible and intangible 
property tax. (Paul, 1975, p. 22)
Furthermore, it is the "inherently regressive nature of
property assessing which turns an inherently proportion?1-
to-progressive tax into a regressive one" (p. 20). The
unequal treatment of equals can, therefore, be attributed
in a great part to inequities in assessment of property
(Johns, Alexander, and Jordan, 1972, p. 84).
Studies have also shown that the greater the non- 
residential component of the property tax base, the higher 
the school district expenditure levels. A high concentra­
tion of non-residential property will result in the 
citizens of that area paying proportionately less than 
taxpayers who live in a primarily residential school
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district (Bowman, Wade, and Ladd, 1978, p. 32) .
Only those revenue sources which can be legally 
and.realistically generated by a governmental unit may be 
included in any plan for school finance. Local govern­
ments are reluctant to adopt progressive local income 
taxes for fear that businesses and residents may locate 
elsewhere; therefore, real property taxes are basically 
the only taxes collected locally (Harrison, 1976, pp. 6-7).
Individuals, institutions, and governments must
all compete for limited resources in resolving their
respective and common needs. Nevertheless, Harrison
(1976) after studying all fifty states maintains that
Places that stress nonproperty taxes and thus 
make relatively low use of property taxes, will 
achieve more wealth neutrality, (pp. 80-81)
It appears, therefore, that the relationship
between school finance and state/local tax policies will
remain controversial for some time.
The new reform movement has two characteristics 
which distinguish it from previous efforts to 
introduce greater equity into school finance laws: 
the first is the reliance on the state court 
system and the appeal to state constitutions which 
commonly require the establishment of an educa­
tional system which is free and uniform; the 
second is the enlistment in the reform cause of a 
variety of actors, including . . . law professors,
economists, political scientists, legislators, 
public interest attorneys, and activists whose 
concern is to provide equitable financing of 
schools for children from minority or improverished 
families. . . .
Members of the 'new breed1 of school finance 
experts differ from their predecessors both in 
their goals and in their heavy reliance on the 
courts as a route to obtaining more equitable
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
revenue distribution systems. Nevertheless, they, 
like their predecessors, must rely on the political 
process for the implementation of their wishes.
. . . State legislatures are still, as in the 
.past, composed of individuals who are responsive to 
the interests of their constituents, and are 
subject to pressures applied by a variety of interest 
groups. (Thomas, 1978, pp. 3-5)
Methodology in Studying Equalization
The most common statistical procedure used to 
study equalization appears to have been the product 
moment correlation coefficient or the rank order corre­
lation (Benson and Kelly, 1966; Hempstead, 1969; Furst, 
1974), a procedure which rests on the assumption that 
equalization aid is distributed in a linear manner 
throughout the whole range of a wealth distribution. 
Hickrod (1978) believes the ease and speed of computer 
programs has probably contributed to the use of such 
correlation studies.
There is some evidence that when dealing with
property-income factors in equalization, a curvilinear
relationship exists:
Up to the median property valuation, the relation­
ship is linear, e.g., property-poor districts are 
income-poor districts and moderately rich property 
districts are also moderately rich income districts. 
However, above the median there is no meaningful 
relationship, e.g., very rich property districts 
may or may not be very rich income districts.
(Hickrod and Hubbard, 1978, pp. 67-68)
Hickrod also advocated the use of curvilinear 
regression to measure deviation from perfect equality 
(Hickrod, 1972, pp. 22-26). On the other hand, Hempstead 
(1970) rejected the use of curvilinear regression and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
found linear regression to be more accurate in measuring 
equalization strength, as did Furst (1974).
Question arises in the selection of a definition 
of "equality." As discussed in chapter I of this paper, 
educators and philosophers have not been able to agree 
on this issue, while the courts have ruled that equal 
educational opportunity has in some way been equated 
with equal dollars.
Research has advanced greatly with the avail­
ability and use of computers in recent years. Nov/ it is 
possible to gather and use an entire population of data 
rather than just a sample. Nevertheless, the inherent 
problems with a study of any magnitude is probably best 
expressed by Hickrod (1978) when he described his evalua­
tion of all 1,025 school districts in Illinois:
The presence of over one thousand districts means 
the researcher is delivered over to the not-so- 
tender mercies of the 'computer jocks' for anything 
that is known at all. Contemplating the high 
probability of programming error in one's data will 
drive even strong men to drink. . . There is a 
good chance that the over one thousand units of 
measurement do contain quite a number of highly 
deviant individual scores which will have all kinds 
of weird results on the researcher's descriptive 
and inferential statistics, (pp. 80-81)
Still another consideration is the selection of 
the best measure of "fiscal capacity" which is defined 
as "a measure of the fiscal bases which a taxing juris­
diction is taxing, or could tax, to raise revenue for 
public purposes" (Johns, Alexander, Jordan, 1972, p. 84). 
These measures include:
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Sales tax collections, per capita personal income, 
per household effective buying power, corporate 
income, per capita retail sales, per household 
retail sales, and per capita property valuation. 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
' 1962, p. 4)
Selection of a measure of capacity is sometimes
restricted by the data available. Hickrod (1978)
explained the problem as follows:
Since Illinois has no annual income data by school 
district, people do look at you rather strangely 
when you explain that the federal census income 
data you are using are nine or ten years old. . . . 
Incredible as it may seem, the largest district in 
the state, Chicago, is not a part of the reporting 
system for certain kinds of data in the state, (p. 81)
In discussing the unavailability until recently of
property valuation data in Illinois by classification such
as residential, farm, commercial, and so forth, Hickrod
continued:
Such classified property valuation data are now 
available on a township basis for a small number 
of counties in Illinois. . . . even these new
data will only be an approximation, since data 
translations from township to school district 
terms will require an assumption that these 
different valuations are evenly spread in a 
township, and we know that not to be true. (p. 69)
It has been pointed out that fiscal capacity as 
measured by assessed valuation is different than fiscal 
capacity as measured by personal income (Patterson, 1968, 
p. 85). While some states such as Kansas use a combina­
tion of property valuation and income as a measurement of 
school district wealth, this type of data is not available 
in Michigan. The ideal choice might be that described 
by Furst (1974):
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It would appear that in any study of the equal­
ization effects of school aid programs, more than 
one measure of fiscal capacity should be used.
(p. 20)
For a study in Michigan in 1979, data was avail­
able for assessed valuations of property. However, 
citizens in Michigan were asked to specify their school 
districts on the 197 8 state income tax returns. Thus, it 
may be possible to obtain a variety of fiscal measures 
in the future as a result of this new reporting device.
The Use of Simulation
The use of simulation is appealing because it
provides a laboratory for analysis of problems that often
cannot be solved by any other means and allows experiment
with systems that would otherwise be impossible or
impractical (Meier, Newell, a Pazer, 1969, p. 1: Shannon,
1976, p. ix). Simulation models are frequently used by
businessmen, economists, and educators in an effort to
develop strategies for problem solving.
It can be claimed with some validity that the 
story of man's progress in science and technology 
is actually the story of his success in the use 
of analogy and his progress in simulation.
(Shapiro & Rogers, 1967, p. v) .
The School Finance Equalization Study Workshop in 
Denver, Colorado, in March 19 77 resulted in the develop­
ment of a computer simulation to aid the South Dakota 
State Legislature in reforming the state school finance 
system (South Dakota Division of Education, 1977). The 
strengths and weaknesses of such a simulated program
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may be evaluated before implementation.
Cox (1976) also using simulation reported results 
of three school finance alternatives and statewide prop­
erty taxation for California school districts. Her 
analysis provided opportunity for examination of the 
advantages or disadvantages of each method prior to 
adoption. In fact, Cox's results showed that any of the 
alternatives studied left families "better off" while 
shifting the costs of education to industrial and com­
mercial land users.
Toder (1975) used simulation techniques to 
examine gains and losses of different groups in the 
population if reform plans were to replace the then 
current funding in Massachusetts. An estimated equation 
was used in conjunction with data from the State of 
Massachusetts and welfare economic data and three reform 
plans: full state funding of public schools, power
equalizing, and a modified percentage-equalization state 
aid plan that was law in Massachusetts at the time of 
the study. Toder found that variants of two reform plans 
were likely to reduce the economic welfare of almost all 
communities in the state. The results suggested that 
private school enrollment was not likely to be altered 
significantly by changes in public school expenditure.
An exploratory study conducted by Bell (1976) 
concluded that the use of micro—simulation was feasible 
to analyze the consequences of various tax assessment
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approaches, particularly a state income tax, in the 
State of Washington. Simulation, therefore, appears to 
hav.e been established as a legitimate method for analysis.
Summary
Chapter II began with a brief look at the histor­
ical background of educational finance in the United 
States including the problems facing the nation and 
educators in the 1970s. Contributions from the outstand­
ing school finance theorists such as Cubberly, Strayer, 
Haig, Mort, Updegraff, and others were examined.
School finance research studies were examined to 
ascertain the kind of studies that have been conducted in 
the past, what the results were of these investigations, 
and what impact finance reforms may have had in correct­
ing disparities in educational opportunities within 
various states. A review was made concerning the questions 
of "wealth" and "effort" including the use or nonuse of 
property tax in equalizing aid to public schools.
The methodology used to study equalization was 
found to vary with the Pearson product-moment-correlation 
being the most frequently used statistical procedure. 
Selection of a definition of equality, use of the computer 
in current research, and a discussion of fiscal capacity 
were also included in the review of literature. Finally, 
the use of simulation was found to be a legitimate 
vehicle for research studies such as this one concerned 
with equalizing tendencies of state aid.
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
Chapter III outlines the Michigan system of 
financing education and the method used in examining 
selected Michigan finance revision proposals. The 
method of data collection is detailed and the hypotheses 
to be tested are stated. Five hundred and thirty K-12 
school districts were included in this study representing 
99.8 percent of ail public school students receiving state 
membership aid in Michigan. The few schools which were 
omitted are elementary districts which are not included 
in the data regularly published by the Michigan Department 
of Education in their Bulletin 1012--a publication which 
reports financial data for public schools within the state
The Michigan System of Financing Education
Michigan's school finance method rests on two 
basic concepts: State Equalized Valuation (S.E.V.)— the
amount of property value or tax base; and millage— the 
rate at which that property value is taxed (Ashmore, 1977) 
In Michigan, if the market value of all property in a 
particular assessing unit is $400 million dollars, the 
assessed valuation for this district should be determined 
to be $200 million— 50 percent of true cash value.
49
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Rawlinson (1977) points out that property taxes
are levied on equalized valuation, not assessed valuation.
If assessors throughout the state were able to accurately
assess all property at 50 percent of its true cash value,
there would be no need for "equalization.” Rawlinson
explains further that value is an illusive thing and is
a product of opinion based upon knowledge and experience.
There is variation among the assessors, and equalization
is required to prevent assessing units from carrying
unfair shares of support for local government programs
administered over more than one assessment district.
Some may not be aware that property taxes are a 
local tax paid to support only local government, 
schools, etc. None of the property tax goes to 
the state, (p. 3)
Each year each piece of property is listed, de­
scribed in detail by the assessor, and improvements, sales 
and other factors are noted to arrive at a figure compar­
able to like property within the assessing unit. At the 
county level the board of commissioners adjusts the 
assessment rolls upward or downward in an attempt to 
establish uniformity within the county. Then the State 
Tax Commission "reviews each county's equalized valuation 
and makes adjustments in order to equalize assessments at 
approximately 50 percent of the true cash value on a 
statewide basis" (Ashmore, 1977, p. 21).
To clarify the mystery regarding equalization after 
the assessor has finished, it is pointed out that an 
'equalization factor' affects the entire assessment 
roll uniformly. The relationship of the valuation 
assigned your property to that assigned your neighbor's
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is not changed. In other words, if your assessment 
is too high in relation to your neighbor's, equal­
ization will not correct the error. Equalization 
merely raises or lowers the entire assessment 
. roll of a unit which brings the total property 
valuation among the various cities and townships 
into proper relationship with each other.
(Rawlinson, 1977, pp. 3-4)
All districts in Michigan are permitted 15 mills 
which may be levied without a vote of the people. Since 
these 15 mills also serve as the basis for all other 
local tax units of government (county, city, township, 
village, etc.), the school may be allocated only eight 
nonvoted mills as its share. It is generally the practice 
for school officials to ask the electors of a district 
to approve additional millage to operate the schools.
The local property taxes generated per pupil in a 
district is the number of voted and nonvoted mills times 
the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil. The 
S.E.V. per pupil is determined by dividing the state equal­
ized valuation for a school district by the number of K-12 
pupils enrolled in school on the fourth Friday after Labor 
Day. If there were 10,000 pupils enrolled and the S.E.V. 
for that district were $200 million dollars, The S.E.V. 
per pupil would be $20,000. If the school district had 
eight nonvoted mills and 20 voted mills, the amount of 
money produced locally for school purposes would be 28 
mills times the S.E.V. per pupil, or .028 x $20,000 
resulting in $56 0 per pupil. Michigan's state membership 
aid formula for each of four years is summarized in 
table I.
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TABLE I
MICHIGAN MEMBERSHIP AID FORMULAE
1974-75 TO 1977-78
School Year Membership Formulae
1974-75 $39,000 minus district S.E.V. per pupil
times tax rate up to 25 mills
1975-76 $42,400 minus district S.E.V. per pupil
times tax rate up to 20 mills plus 
$38,250 minus district S.E.V. per 
pupil times tax rate next 7 mills 
not to exceed 27 mills total
1976-77 $43,900 minus district S.E.V. per pupil
times tax rate up no 20 mills plus 
$39,600 minus district S.E.V. per 
pupil times tax rate next 3 mills 
not to exceed 28 mills total
*1977-78 $164 per pupil plus $40 per mill of tax
levied up to 30 mills = state gross 
allowance guaranteed. State gross 
guarantee minus product of district 
S.E.V. per pupil and tax rate = 
net allowance per pupil
*Source: Act No. 90 of Public Acts of 1977, State of
Michigan, 79tn Legislature
Under the 1977-78 state aid formula, the maximum 
amount guaranteed per pupil would be $164 plus $4 0 
times 30 mills or $1,364. School districts could vote 
more or less than 30 mills, but the state aid paid would 
be determined up to the first 30 mills.
To compute state aid for the example given using 
the 1977-78 formula, the state's guarantee of $1,364 minus 
the district's S.E.V. per pupil of $20,000 times the tax 
rate of .028 = $1,364 - $560 = $864 state aid per pupil.
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If the school district's S.E.V. goes up, the 
district does not receive more total dollars; rather, 
more, local taxes will be required with less contribution 
on the part of the state. The problem faced in recent 
times has been that the value of real estate has greatly 
appreciated.
The more the property value increased, the more 
taxes the local property owner pays, and the
less state aid the state pays on the same mills
levied. As a result, the schools receive the 
same net total. (Weinheimer, 1977, p. 5)
In addition to the state allocation per pupil 
based on the membership aid formula, each district may 
also receive "categorical" state aid for special needs 
programs such as special education, transportation, com­
pensatory education and vocational education. School 
financial data provided by the Michigan Department of 
Education do not separate categorical aid from general 
operating aid. In analyzing the Tisch and Siljander 
finance revision proposals it was not necessary to know 
the amount of categorical aid per school district since
the total funds available to each school district would
remain the same; only the source of those funds would be 
changed.
However, for purposes of this study wherein 
changes in the state aid formula were investigated, it 
was necessary to determine the amounts of categorical aid 
paid each school district. By computing the actual 
membership aid for each school district under the 1977-78
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formula, then subtracting this aid from the total state 
apportionment for each district, it was possible to 
determine the amount of categorical aid for each district. 
When categorical aid was removed from the state apportion­
ment, the subsequent analyses more accurately reflected 
the effects of any changes in formula.
Selected Michigan Finance-Revision Proposals
The finance-revision proposals which were given 
consideration in this study are described in the follow­
ing paragraphs.
The Tisch Proposal, authored by Robert Tisch, 
drain commissioner of Shiawassee County, would roll back 
property assessment to 25 percent of cash value on all 
property, thereby reducing present taxes by 5 0 percent.
The Tisch Proposal would permit the state to increase in­
come taxes by 1 percent to make up for lost revenue, and 
with voter approval, would permit a second 1 percent in­
come tax hike to support schools (Heraid-Palladium,
July 10, 1978).
Mark D. Siljander, State Representative of the 
42nd District in Michigan, advocated tax reform in 
Michigan for over a year. Siljander organized the Tax 
Efficiency Association of Michigan, Inc. (TEAM) to muster 
support for his tax proposal. In April 19 7 8 he intro­
duced a resolution to the Legislature calling for an 
amendment to the state constitution. Highlights of this 
resolution were:
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a. Reduce property taxes of residential and agricul­
tural and timber-cutover properties by 60 percent. 
(This represents a change from assessing property 
at 50 percent of true cash value to 20 percent of 
true cash value. All other property classifica­
tions would remain at 50 percent.)
b. Limit assessment increases for ail property taxes 
to seven percent per year.
c. Equalize property by classification to eliminate
current inequities.
d. Guarantee that the State will make up losses to 
local governments and school districts. Differ­
ence to be made up from the income tax and lottery 
monies.
e. Have a local control provision; even though the 
state is required to make up the difference, 
local people will still have control over how to 
spend their monies.
f. Guarantee a minimum amount of state aid per pupil
and end forced reliance on property taxes with
resultant shift to local costs.
g. Give senior citizens and veterans tax breaks. 
(Siljander, 1978)
Variations in the Tisch and Siljander proposals 
which specified larger reductions in property valuations 
than the original proposals were also examined for the 
resulting equalizing effects.
Two variations of the Siljander proposal requiring 
ceilings on the amount of eligible state aid were likewise 
i n v e s t i g a t e d  for the resulting equalizing effects.
Slight dollar increases in the guaranteed yield 
formula and/or removal of the 30-mill ceiling were studied 
as alternatives since "the formula is at least as impor­
tant as the amount of state aid as a determinant of 
expenditure equality" (Harrison, 1976, p. 11).
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Data Collection
The Michigan Department of Education provided a 
computer tape copy and punched computer cards indicating 
the state equalized valuations (S.E.V.) for each political 
subdivision (township, village, city) within each school 
district in the State or Michigan for the 1977-78 school 
year. Included were data indicating the number of pupils 
enrolled in each of the 53 0 K-12 Michigan school districts 
on the fourth Friday after Labor Day; che tax rate 
for each school district; the amount of state aid (appor­
tionment) paid to each school district based on the local 
tax rate; and the amount of local taxes generated for 
school purposes for each school district.
The Michigan Tax Commission authorized the 
Michigan Treasury Department to release a copy of the com­
puter tape containing assessed property values by property 
classification for each political subdivision in the 
state for 1977. State apportionment to school districts 
for 1977-78 is based on 1977 property tax information.
This information included the amount of property designated 
as agricultural, commercial, industrial, residential, 
and timber-cutover for real property; and as agricultural, 
commercial, industrial, residential, and utility for 
personal property.
There are 1,783 different assessing units in 
Michigan including 1,254 township-assessing districts;
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245 city-assessing districts; and 284 village-assessing 
districts (Rawlinson, 1978). These 1,783 assessing units 
are distributed among 530 school districts. To study the 
effects of the Siljander tax proposal it was necessary to 
combine the data collected for school systems and property 
valuations.
Since a township or other political subdivision 
might overlap two or more school systems, the percentage 
of each township within a school system was determined.
For example, Royalton township overlaps three school 
systems as summarized in table 2.
TABLE 2
1977 EQUALIZED REAL PROPERTY VALUATIONS (IN DOLLARS) 3Y 








Berrien Springs 1,967,566 10.84
Lakeshore 4,456,870 24 . 57
St. Joseph 11,718,356 64 . 59
Totals 18,142,792 100.00
This example is further seen in the Berrien 
Springs Public Schools which are composed of three 
political subdivisions: Berrien township, Oronoko town­
ship, and Royalton township. A determination was made
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as to what percentage of the total Berrien Springs 
schools equalized value was represented by each of the 
three townships. The results are summarized in table 3.
TABLE 3
1977 EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES (IN DOLLARS) BY TOWNSHIP 








Berrien 11,059,866 20.52 67.25
Oronoko 40,862,604 75.83 99. 04
Royalton 1,967 ,566 3.65 10.84
Totals 53,890,036 100.00 —
For each school district the state equalized 
valuation of property by property class was calculated. 
The proportion of property class in each assessing unit 
was determined for each school district within that unit. 
The same proportion was used in assigning each property 
class to the school district. For example, 3.65 percent 
of the total property value of Royalton township is 
included in the Berrien Springs district; therefore, 3.65 
percent of each property classification in Royalton was 
assigned to the Berrien Springs school district. It was 
recognized that these different valuations by classifica­
tion are not spread evenly in each township and that an 
approximation of each property classification per town­
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ship would result. Therefore, additional cross checks 
and adjustments were made to be sure that the resulting 
property class distributions by school districts equaled 
total valuations by classification for the township, 
county, and state. Slight variations in data were found 
due to rounding differences. The foregoing procedure was 
applied to all 1,783 different assessing units in 
Michigan and the 530 K-12 school districts included in 
this study.
Every researcher hopes to produce results that 
will contribute in some practical way to present knowl­
edge. Results which may be significant statistically may 
not be of practical significance. Power analysis is one 
technique employed to assist the researcher in measuring 
the degree to which his results prove "the existence of 
the phenomenon under test" (Cohen, 1963, p. 2). Power is 
the probability of getting a significant result if the 
null hypothesis is false. Rejection of the null hypothe­
sis means that the alternative hypothesis is true to 
some nonzero degree:
The null hypothesis always means that the effect 
size is zero. . . . When the null hypothesis is
false, it is false to some specific degree, i.e., 
the effect size (ES) is some specific nonzero 
value in the population. (Cohen, 1969, p. 1)
Cohen (1969) asserts that the four parameters of 
statistical inference (power, significance criterion, 
sample size, and effect size) are so related "that any one 
of them is a function of the other three, which means that
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when any three of them are fixed, the fourth is completely 
determined" (p. 14). In this study the desired power was 
s et.at .95, the significance criterion (alpha) was .05, 
and the sample size, n = 530. In dealing with the differ­
ences between population correlation coefficients, the 
effect size represents the "amount of change in the pro­
portion of variance accounted for" (p. 110); the effect 
size is a function of the difference between two r ^ 's .
The effect size was then determined to be .14 which means 
that there must be a 14 percent difference of variance 
accounted for from the null hypothesis in this study 
before the results may be considered to be of practical 
significance.
Data Analysis
This study utilized two statistical procedures 
to analyze the effects that would occur should one of 
the selected tax-reform proposals be adopted: (1) the
Pearson product-moment-correlation and (2) a test of the 
difference between two correlation coefficients obtained 
from independent samples.
The first step utilized the Pearson product- 
moment correlation where the state equalized valuation 
(S.E.V.) per pupil per school district was the independent 
variable and the state aid per school district resulting 
from each reform proposal was the dependent variable.
The correlation coefficient was computed for each analysis 
to ascertain equalizing tendencies of each finance-
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revision plan and for comparison with the 1977-78 
coefficient.
Correlation is a measure of relationship between 
two variables but does nor imply that one is the cause of 
the other (Downie and Heath, 1965, p. 78). The size of 
the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient (r) 
varies from +1.0 (perfect positive relationship) through 
0 (no relationship between the two measures) to -1.0 
(perfect negative relationship). The square of the 
coefficient expresses the percentage of the variance 
shared by the two distributions (Borg & Gall, 1971).
The two distributions in this study were the state equal­
ized valuations (S.E.V.) per pupil and the state aid per 
pupil as determined for each of the proposals under 
investigation. A correlation of .71 would mean that 50 
percent of the variance in the one measure is accounted 
for by the variance in the other; and each in turn has 
50 percent unique variance not accounted for by the 
other (Guilford, 1956).
A negative correlation infers that poor school 
districts receive more state aid per S.E.V. than wealthy 
districts; and consequently, a negative correlation 
infers equalizing tendencies. A positive correlation 
infers that wealthy districts receive more state aid per 
S.E.V. than poor districts and therefore indicates dis- 
equalizing tendencies.
The second step was to transform the correlation
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coefficients into Fisher's !,z" scores or standard scores 
to test the difference between the correlation coeffi­
cients. Z scores are often selected to make tests of 
significance when the number of observations in the 
sample is large; and a large number of observations can 
be expected to approximate a normal curve (Downie &
Heath, 1965, pp. 64-77; 128-130).
The 5 percent level of significance was selected 
in this study which means that there are five chances in 
one hundred that the null hypothesis might be rejected 
when it is actually true. "A z score of 1.96 taken at 
each end of the normal curve cuts off 5 percent of the 
total area" (Downie & Heath, 1965 , p. 129) . Therefore, 
a z score larger than 1.96, positive or negative, would 
be considered significant at the .05 level and the 
hypothesis would be rejected.
In addition, the effect size criterion of .14 was 
applied to the results of each analysis. There was no 
interest in any effect size less than +.14 since it 
would account for less than 14 percent of the variance 
and have no practical value.
For purposes of this study, the following nine 
hypotheses were tested:
1. There is no significant difference in the
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
there is a 50 percent reduction across-the-board in all
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real property with the state providing funds to make up 
for lost revenues (Tisch proposal) -
2. There is no significant difference in the
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
there is a 60 percent reduction across-the-board in all 
real property with the state providing funds to make up 
for lost revenues (variation of Tisch proposal).
3. There is no significant difference in the
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
there is a 60 percent reduction in the valuation of 
residential, agricultural, and timber-cutover properties, 
and state funds are provided to make up for lost revenues 
(proposed Siljander amendment).
4. There is no significant difference in the 
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
there is a 60 percent reduction in the values of 
residential, agricultural, and timber-cutover properties, 
and a 20 percent reduction in commercial, industrial, and 
utility properties with state funds provided to make up 
lost revenues (variation A of proposed Siljander amend­
ment.
5. There is no significant difference in the 
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when
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there is a 60 percent reduction in the values of residen­
tial, agricultural, and timber-cutover properties and 
the- state provides funds to make up for lost revenues. 
Exceptions are that no payments would be made to school 
districts which resulted in combined state and local aid 
greater than one-and-one-half times the total revenues 
of the school district with the lowest combined state 
and local aid per pupil (variation B of Siljander pro­
posal) .
6. There is no significant difference in the 
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
there is a 60 percent reduction in the values of residen­
tial, agricultural and timber-cutover properties, and the 
state provides funds to make up for lost revenues. Excep­
tions are that no payments would be made to school dis­
tricts which resulted in combined state and local aid 
greater than two times the total revenues of the scnool 
district with the lowest combined state and local aid per 
pupil (variation C of Siljander proposal).
7. There is no significant difference in che 
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
the state aid formula is changed from the 1977-78 formula 
of $164 plus $40 per mill per pupil up to 30 mills to
a base of $164 plus $45 per mill per pupil up to 30 mills.
8. There is no significant difference in the
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correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when the 
30-mill ceiling for the state aid formula is removed 
and the state guarantees S.E.V. of $40,000 plus $164 per 
pupil for all mills levied.
9. There is no significant difference in the 
correlation between state aid per pupil to local school 
districts and state equalized valuation per pupil when 
both the guaranteed base is raised from $164 plus $4 0 
per mill to $164 plus $45 per mill and the ceiling on 
mills is removed.
For each of the hypotheses listed above, a 
separate analysis was performed. The first analysis 
dealt with the Tisch proposal to make a 50 percent 
reduction in all real property. State funds would 
make up for lost revenues. The resulting loss in local 
revenue was determined by applying the effective tax rate 
in each school district to the value of the lost property 
for each district. The tax on the lost property was then 
added to the total state apportionment. Both the remain­
ing S.E.V. and the state apportionment were divided 
by the number of state aid pupils to determine S.E.V. per 
pupil and state appropriation per pupil for each district 
in the state. These two distributions were then compared 
by the use of the Pearson product-moment-correlation 
coefficient to determine equalizing effects of state aid.
The second analysis was variation A of the
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Tisch proposal wherein a 60 percent reduction across-the- 
board was made in all real property. Again, the proposal 
required that the state funds would make up for lost 
revenues. The resulting loss in local revenue was 
determined by applying the effective tax rate in each 
school district to the value of the lost property for 
each district. This amount was then added to the total 
state apportionment. Both the remaining S.E.V. and the 
state apportionment v/ere then divided by the number of 
state aid pupils to determine S.E.V. per pupil and state 
appropriation per pupil for each district in the state. 
The two distributions were compared by the use of the 
Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient to 
determine the equalizing effects of state aid.
The third analysis dealt with Siljander's 
proposal to reduce property valuation on agricultural and 
residential and timber-cutover properties by 60 percent 
and provide state funds to make up for lost revenues. In 
this study, the resulting loss in local revenue was 
determined by applying the effective tax rate in each 
school district to the value of the property lost for 
each district. This amount was then added to the total 
state apportionment. Both the remaining S.E.V. and the 
state apportionment were then divided by the number of 
state aid pupils to give the S.E.V. per pupil and state 
appropriation per pupil for each district in the state. 
These two distributions were then compared by use of the
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Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient to 
determine the equalizing effects of state aid.
The fourth analysis was variation A of the 
Siljander proposal which made a 60 percent reduction in 
agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover properties 
and a 20 percent reduction in commercial, industrial, and 
utility property. State funds would make up for lost 
revenues. The resulting loss in local revenue in this 
analysis was determined by applying the effective tax 
rate in each school district to the value of the lost 
property for each district. This amount was then added 
to the total state apportionment. Seth the remaining 
S.E.V. and the state apportionment were then divided by 
the number of state aid pupils to give S.E.V. per pupil 
and state appropriation per pupil for each district in the 
state. A comparison of these distributions was made by 
the use of the Pearson product-moment-correlation coeffi­
cient to determine the equalizing effects of state aid.
The fifth analysis, variation B of Siljander's 
proposal, studied the results of a reduction of 60 percent 
in all values of residential, agricultural and timber- 
cutover properties. The state would provide funds to 
make up for lost revenues. However, no payment would be 
made to a school district which would result in combined 
state and local aid greater than one-and-one-half times 
the total revenues of the school district with the lowest 
combined state and local revenue per pupil. The resulting
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loss in local revenue in this analysis was determined by 
applying the effective tax rate in each school district 
to the value of the lost property for each district. This 
amount was then added to the total state apportionment. 
Both the remaining S.E.V. and the state apportionment 
were then divided by the number of state aid pupils 
giving S.E.V. per pupil and state appropriation per pupil 
for each district in the state. The district with the 
lowest combined total state and local revenue per pupil 
was determined and a ceiling was set at one-and-one-half 
times this amount. No school district would receive state 
aid which would result in total revenues above this ceil­
ing. These two distributions were then compared by the 
use of the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient 
to determine the equalizing effects of state aid.
The sixth analysis, variation C of Siljander's 
proposal, studied the results of a reduction of 60 percent 
in all values of residential, agricultural and timber-cut­
over properties. The state would provide funds co make 
up for lost revenues. However, no payment would be 
made to a school district which would result in 
combined state and local aid greater than two times 
the total revenues of the school district with the lowest 
combined state and local aid per pupil. The resulting 
loss in local revenue in this analysis was determined by 
applying the effective tax rate in each school district 
to the value of the lost property for each district.
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This amount was then added to the total state apportion­
ment. Both the remaining S.E.V. and the state apportion­
ment- were then divided by the number of state aid pupils 
to give S.E.V. per pupil and state appropriation per 
pupil for each district in the state. The district 
with the lowest combined total state and local revenues 
per pupil was determined and a ceiling was set at two 
times this amount. No school district would receive 
state aid resulting in total revenues above this ceil­
ing. These two distributions were then compared by the 
use of the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient 
to determine the equalizing effects of state aid.
The seventh analysis changed the state aid 
formula from the 1977-78 $164 plus $40,000 S.E.V. guaran­
tee per pupil up to 30 mills to $164 plus S45,000 S.E.V. 
guarantee per pupil up to 30 mills. The actual membership 
aid for each school district was computed under the 1977- 
78 formula (tax rate times guaranteed S.E.V. minus tax 
rate times district S.E.V. up to 30 mills), and by sub­
tracting this amount from the 1977-78 state apportionment 
for each district, it was possible to determine the amount 
of categorical aid for each district. Categorical aid 
was removed from the state apportionment figures to 
determine equalization aid under the 1977-78 formula. The 
effective tax rate for each district was then applied 
to the new proposed guarantee, i.e., $45,000 per pupil 
up to 30 mills, and the tax rate times the district S.E.V.
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was subtracted to determine the new equalization aid.
The categorical amounts were added to the new equaliza­
tion aid to get total apportionment. Both the state 
equalized valuation and the state apportionment were 
divided by the number of state aid pupils to give S.E.V. 
per pupil and state appropriation per pupil for each 
district in the state. These two distributions were 
compared by the use of the Pearson product-moment- 
correlation coefficient to determine the equalizing 
effects of this change in the state formula.
The eighth analysis required the removal of the 
30-mill ceiling for state aid. The formula used was 
$164 plus $40,000 S.E.V. guaranteed for all mills levied. 
No ceiling was used. The actual membership aid for each 
school district was computed under the 1977-78 formula.
By subtracting this amount from the total 1977-78 state 
apportionment for each district, it was possible to 
determine the amount of categorical aid for each district. 
Categorical aid was removed from the state apportionment 
figures to determine equalization aid under the 1977-7 8 
formula. The effective tax rate for each district was 
then applied to the new proposed guarantee, i.e., $164 
plus $40,000 S.E.V. per pupil for all mills levied. The 
tax rate times the district S.E.V. was subtracted to 
determine the new equalization aid. The categorical 
amounts were added to the new equalization aid to get 
total apportionment. Both the state equalized valuation
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number of state aid pupils giving S.E.V. per pupil and 
state appropriation per pupil for each district in the 
state. These two distributions were compared by the use 
of the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient 
to determine the equalizing effects of this change in 
the state formula wherein the ceiling had been removed.
The ninth analysis required (1) a change in 
the amount of aid guaranteed each pupil— from $164 plus 
$40 per mill per pupil guaranteed up to 30 mills to $164 
plus $45 per mill per pupil guaranteed, and (2) removal o 
the 30-mill ceiling. The actual membership aid for each 
school district was computed under the 1977-78 formula, 
and by subtracting this amount from the total 1977-78 
state apportionment for each district, it was possible to 
determine the amount of categorical aid for each district 
Categorical aid was removed from the state apportionment 
figures to determine equalization aid under the 1977-78 
formula. The effective tax rate for each district was 
then applied to the new proposed guarantee, $164 plus $45 
per mill per pupil guaranteed for all mills levied and 
the tax rate times the district S.E.V. was subtracted to 
determine the new equalization aid. The categorical 
amounts were added to the new equalization aid to get 
total apportionment. Both the state equalized valuation 
and the state apportionment were divided by the 
number of state aid pupils to give S.E.V. per pupil and
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state appropriation per pupil for each district in the 
state. These two distributions were compared by the 
use-of the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient 
to determine the equalizing effects of this change in the 
state formula.
After each analysis, the resulting coefficient 
was compared with the 1977-78 correlation coefficient 
betv/een state aid and S.E.V. by the test of the differ­
ence between two correlation coefficients obtained from 
independent samples. This resulted in a z score. A z 
score of +1.96 or greater indicated a statistically 
significant change in equalization as a result of the 
proposal analyzed. In addition, the effect size criterion 
of .14 was applied to the results of each analysis.
There was no interest in any effect size less than +.14 
since it would account for less than 14 percent of the 
variance and would have no practical significance.
Summary
Chapter III described Michigan's system of 
financing education, and the finance revision proposals 
selected for consideration were explained. The Tisch 
and Siljander proposals and variations thereof were 
stated. Three additional analyses using changes in the 
state aid formula were outlined.
A detailed description of the method of data 
collection was given. Nine hypotheses were stated in the
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null form. A separate analysis was performed on each of 
the nine hypotheses using the Pearson product-moment- 
correlation to determine the equalizing effects of state 
aid. Separate analyses were also made to test the 
difference of correlation coefficients by means of a 
z score to ascertain whether there was a significant 
change in correlation. Lastly, the results of each 
analysis were compared to the effect size criterion of 
.14 to ascertain whether or not the results were of 
practical significance.
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Chapter IV presents the data collected for the 
study. Five hundred and thirty school districts are 
included which represent 99.8 percent of all public school 
students in grades K-12 in the state of Michigan. Corre­
lations are presented between the state equalized valua­
tion (S.E.V.) per pupil and the state apportionment per 
pupil for the 1977-78 school year data as well as for each 
of nine proposed finance-revision plans chosen for this 
investigation. A statistical analysis is given for 
each finance plan.
Analysis of Data: 1977-78 School Year
An analysis of the existing 1977-78 data was 
made to establish a base for comparison. The school dis­
trict with the lowest state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) 
per pupil was the Gwinn Area Community Schools with 
$9,671.20 per pupil while the Bridgman Public Schools had 
a state equalized valuation per pupil (S.E.V.) of 
$301,413— about 31 times as much equalized property value. 
At the same time, the Gwinn schools had a total income, 
local and state aid combined, of $1,129.60 per pupil 
compared to Bridgman with $2,594.70 per pupil. Although
74
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the Gwinn schools had less than half as much money per 
pupil as Bridgman did, it was necessary for the Gwinn 
schools to make a "tax effort" of 15.18 voted mills in 
addition to the 6.81 nonvoted mills levied in their dis­
trict in order to produce their revenue (.0220 tax rate). 
On the other hand, Bridgman had no voted mills in addi­
tion to their 8.3 nonvoted mills (total .0083 tax rate). 
Taxpayers in the Bridgman district benefit from the 
presence of a nuclear plant which pays considerable taxes. 
There were 3,486 students in the Gwinn schools and 387 in 
the Bridgman schools. Gwinn received $917 per pupil in 
state aid while Bridgman students received $96 each in 
state appropriations. It can be seen that state aid had 
an equalizing effect as depicted in table 4.
TABLE 4
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
1977-78 STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS (IN DOLLARS)











(Highest) 301,413.00 96.00 2,498.70 2 , 594 . 70
Gwinn
(Lowest) 9, 671.20 917.00 212.60 1,129.60
Range 291,742.20 811.00 2,286.10 1,465.10
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The school district with the lowest state appro­
priation per pupil in 1977-78 was Beaver Island Community 
Schools which received no aid at all. The school district 
which received the highest state appropriation was North- 
ville Public Schools in the amount of $1,555.70 per 
pupil. The Beaver Island schools had 54 pupils compared 
to Northville's 4,941; and Beaver Island schools had
S.E.V. per pupil of $124,189.70— more than three-and-one 
half times as much S.E.V. as Northville's $32,472.60. 
Northville taxpayers paid a tax rate of .0328 to produce 
$1,065.10 per pupil in contrast to Beaver Island's .0091 
which generated $1,130.10 per pupil. However, because of 
Michigan's state aid formula, Northville had more than 
twice as much revenue for its students. Note in table 5 
that again state aid had an equalizing effect for the 
district poorer in property wealth.
TABLE 5
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
1977-78 STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 










(Highest) 1,555.70 32,472.60 1,065.10 2,620.10
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) oo 124,189.70 1,130.10 1,130.10
Range 1,555.70 91,717.10 65.10 1,490.00
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The school district with the least combined 
state aid and local income in 1977-78 was the Lake City
Area School District with $987.40 per pupil. The school
district with the most combined state aid and local income 
was the Northville Public Schools with $2,620.10 per 
pupil, a difference of $1,632.70. The number of pupils 
served in the Lake City area schools was 1,15 9 compared to 
Northville with 4,941 students. Lake City's tax rate was 
.0190 while Northville's was .0328. The S.E.V. per pupil 
for Lake City was $37,336.90 and for Northville the S.E.V. 
per pupil was $32,472.60, a difference of $4,864.30. 
Therefore, the school district with the most income per 
pupil had almost three times as much revenue per pupil as 
the lowest school district. This may be explained by the 
lower tax rate and higher S.E.V. per pupil in Lake City.
These data are summarized in table 6.
TABLE 6
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
1977-78 TOTAL INCOME (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 










(Highest) 2,620.10 32,472.60 1,555.00 1,065.10
Lake City 
(Lowest) 987.40 37,336.90 278.00 709.40
Range 1,632.70 4,864.30 1,277.00 355.70
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A correlation of the existing 1977-78 data was 
computed using the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per 
pupil and the state apportionment per pupil. The result 
was a correlation coefficient of -.729, significant at the 
.001 level of confidence, indicating a strong negative 
relationship; therefore, the 1977-78 finance plan indicated 
a strong equalizing effect. This correlation coefficient 
was used for comparison with all subsequent finance re­
vision proposals.
Analysis 1— Tisch Proposal
The first finance reform analysis of this study 
concerned the Tisch proposal which called for a 50 per­
cent across-the-board cut in all real property values. The 
resulting loss in tax revenues was to be made up by in­
creases in state apportionment. Under this proposal the 
school district with the lowest state equalized valuation 
(S.E.V.) per pupil was the Gwinn Area Community Schools.
The Gwinn schools were also the lowest in S.E.V. per 
pupil under the 1977-78 system of financing. The Bridgman 
Public Schools had the highest S.E.V. per pupil under the 
Tisch plan as it did under the 1977-78 analysis. Under 
the Tisch finance proposal the Gwinn schools would have an 
S.E.V. of $4,835.60 and Bridgman would have S.E.V. per 
pupil of $150,706.50, a difference of $145,870.90 per 
pupil, or half the 1977-78 values.
Using the Tisch proposal all schools in the state 
would also receive half as much income from local taxes
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due to the 50 percent reduction in property values. How­
ever all schools would maintain exactly the same level of 
total income as 1977-7 8, with the same tax rates, as the 
loss in local income would be made up by the state.
Gwinn, the poorest property-wealth district in the 
state, would receive an increase in state aid of only 
$106 over 1977-78. On the other hand, Bridgman (with 
property wealth more than thirty times greater than Gwinn 
as determined by the Tisch plan) would receive an in­
crease in state aid of $1,249— almost twelve times more 
than Gwinn. This demonstrates how the inequities in state 
aid to rich and poor schools would be perpetuated or in­
creased by using the Tisch proposal. These data are 
summarized in table 7.
TABLE 7
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 










(Highest) 150,706.50 1,345.00 1,249.40 2,594.40
Gwinn
(Lowest) 4 , 835.60 1,023.00 106.30 1,129.30
Range 145,870.90 322.00 1,143.10 1,465.10
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Under the Tisch proposal the school district with 
the lowest state appropriation per pupil was the Beaver 
Island Community schools with $565 per pupil. The school 
district with the highest state appropriation per pupil 
was Northville Public Schools with $2,0 38.30, a range be­
tween the highest and lowest schools of $1,52 3.30. The 
highest aid was more than tv/o-and-one-half the amount of 
the lowest state aid. Northville's tax rate was .0 328 
compared with Beaver Island's .0091. These date are 
summarized in table 8.
TABLE 8
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE











(Highest) 2,088.30 16,236.30 532.60 2 ,620. 60
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) 565.00 62,094.90 565.00 1,130.00
Range 1,523.30 45,858.60 32.40 1,490.60
A comparison of the data for 1977-7 8 and the 
Tisch proposal for the highest and lowest state aid school 
districts indicates that both would receive increases of 
over $500 in state aid under the Tisch plan. These data 
are summarized in table 9.
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TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-78 AND TISCH PROPOSAL FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST STATE 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 











(Highest) 1,555.70 2,088.30 +532.60
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) . 00 565.00 +565.00
Range 1,555.70 1,523.30 -32.40
Hypothesis 1 stated that there is no significant 
difference in correlation between state aid per pupil to 
local school districts and state equalized valuation per 
pupil when there is a 50 percent reduction in all real 
property with the state providing funds to make up for 
the lost revenues. The correlation between state aid per 
pupil and S.E.V. per pupil under this plan yielded a co­
efficient of -.326, significant at the .001 level of 
confidence, indicating negative relationship and equaliz­
ing tendencies. This correlation was compared with the 
1977-78 correlation of -.729 by using the test of the 
difference between correlation coefficients from two 
independent samples which produced a z score of -9.5578. 
This z score was greater than -1.96, therefore there is
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a significant difference in the correlation under the 
Tisch proposal. Hypothesis 1 was rejected at the .05 
level. This difference between the correlations for the 
Tisch and the 1977-78 finance methods produced an effect 
size of .42 which exceeded the criterion level of .14 
and means that 4 2 percent of the variance is accounted 
for by the difference between the 1977-7 8 data and the 
Tisch proposal. This difference is of practical signifi­
cance and would result in considerable reduction in the 
equalizing effects of state aid to all school districts 
in Michigan.
Analysis 2— Tisch Variation
The second analysis called for a 6 0 percent reduc­
tion in all real property. This variation of the Tisch 
proposal was included in the study to determine what 
effects a larger reduction of the property values would 
have on the equalization of education in Michigan.
The school district with the lowest state equal­
ized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil under this finance 
variation was the Gwinn Area Community Schools, and 
the highest S.E.V. per pupil was the Bridgman Public 
schools. The new range was a low of $3,868.40 for Gwinn 
and a high of $120,565.10 for Bridgman, with a difference 
of $116,696.70 in S.E.V. per pupil. The Gwinn schools 
would receive $1,045 in state aid as opposed to $917 in 
1977-78, and Bridgman would receive $1,595 in state aid
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per pupil compared with $96 per pupil in 1977-78. By 
design, the tax rates and total income (combined state 
aid and local income) would remain at the 1977-78 level. 
The state would make up the lost local revenues. This 
variation was more di.sequalizing than the original 
Tisch proposal. The richest property-wealth district in 
the state would receive more aid per pupil under this plan 
($1,595.40 vs. $1,345) and the poorest district would re­
ceive a smaller per pupil increase ($1,045.20 vs. $1,023). 
These data are summarized in table 10.
TABLE 10
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER 











(Highest) 120,565.10 1,595.40 999.50 2,594.50
Gwinn
(Lowest) 3,868.40 1,045.20 85. 10 1,130.10
Range 116,696.70 550.20 914.40 1,464.40
Under this Tisch variation, the lowest amount of 
state aid would be paid to the Beaver Island Community 
Schools which would receive $678 per pupil compared to 
zero (0) dollars in 1977-78. The highest amount of state 
aid would be paid to Northville schools which would
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receive $2,194.80 compared to $1,555.70 in 1977-78. The 
highest state aid school district would, therefore, 
receive over three times the amount of the lowest state 
aid district. (See table 11).
TABLE 11
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE 











(Highest) 2,194.80 12,989.00 426.00 2,620.00
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) 678.00 49 ,675. 90 452.10 1,130.10
Range 1,516.80 36,686.90 29.90 1,489.90
Both the highest state aid district and the low­
est state aid district would receive over $600 each in 
additional state aid compared to 1977-78 to offset the 
reduction in locally produced revenues. These data are 
summarized in table 12. More state aid would go to the 
higher property-wealth district decreasing the equaliz­
ing effects of state aid under the Tisch variation 
proposal.
Hypothesis 2 states that there is no signifi­
cant difference in the correlation between state aid per 
pupil to the local school district and state equalized
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TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-78 AND TISCH VARIATION FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST STATE 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 












(Highest) 1, 555. 70 2,194.80 +639.10
Beaver Island 
(Lowe s t ) .00 678.00 +678.00
Range 1,555.70 1,516.80 38.90
valuation per pupil when there is a 60 percent reduction 
in all real property with the state providing funds to 
make up for lost revenues (variation of Tisch proposal). 
The correlation between state aid per pupil and the 5.E.V. 
per pupil under this plan yielded a coefficient of -.137, 
significant at the .01 level, indicating a negative 
relationship and equalizing tendencies. A test of the 
difference between correlation coefficients from two 
independent samples produced a z score of -12.8152. This 
z score was greater than -1.96, therefore there is a 
significant difference in the correlation under the Tisch 
variation plan. Hypothesis 2 was rejected at the .05 
level. The difference between the correlations for the 
Tisch variation and the 1977-78 finance plans produced
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an effect size of .51 which exceeded the criterion level 
of .14 and means that 51 percent of the variance is 
accounted for by the difference between the 1977-78 data 
and the Tisch variation plan. This differences is of 
practical significance and would result in considerable 
reduction in the equalizing effects of state aid to all 
school districts in Michigan. It appears that the greater 
the reduction in property valuations, the greater the 
reduction in equalizing effects of state aid.
Analysis 3— Siljander Proposed Amendment
The third proposal required a reduction in all 
agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover properties 
by 60 percent and required the state to make up for lost 
revenues.
The school district with the lowest state equal­
ized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil under this finance 
plan was the Gwinn Area Community Schools with $4,764.30, 
and the highest S.E.V. per pupil was in the Bridgman 
schools with $286,170.10 per pupil, a range of 
$281,406.80. The Gwinn schools would receive $1,026.10 
in state aid per pupil while Bridgman would receive 
$230.40 per pupil. Bridgman, the richest school district 
in the state, has more than sixty times as much S.E.V. 
per student as the poorest district; nevertheless,
Bridgman would receive almost one-fourth as much state 
aid per pupil as the poorest school district in the state
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under Siljander's plan. These data are summarized in 
table 13.
TABLE 13
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER 











(Highest) 286,170.10 230.40 2,372.30 2,602.30
Gwinn
(Lowest) 4,764.30 1,026.10 104.70 1,130.30
Range 281,405.80 795.70 2,267.60 1,472.50
Bridgman would continue to generate a large 
amount of local revenue under the Siljander plan since 
commercial, industrial, and utility properties would 
not be reduced under this finance proposal. The Cook 
Nuclear plant located in Bridgman would continue to be 
responsible for the high S.E.V. per pupil and would 
continue to produce a large amount of local tax.
The lowest amount of state aid would be paid to 
the Bridgman schools which would receive $230.40 per 
pupil compared to $96 in 1977-78. The highest amount of 
state aid would be paid to Northville Public Schools in 
the amount of $2,039.90 compared to $1,555.70 per pupil 
in 1977-78. Since only agricultural, residential, and
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timber-cutover properties would be reduced under this 
plan, those districts with high concentrations of com­
mercial, industrial, and utility property would continue 
to produce more local revenues for school purposes than 
those areas that are primarily farming or residential.
In spite of the fact that there is a difference of 
$1,809.50 in state aid between the highest and lowest 
recipients (as summarized in table 14), the total income 
for these two schools differs by only $34. The data 
confirms the equalizing effects of state aid using 
Siljander's plan.
TABLE 14
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE 











(Highest) 2,039.90 18,209.90 597.30 2,636.30
Bridgman
(Lowest) 230.40 286,170.10 2,372.30 2,602.30
Range 1,809.50 267,960.20 1,775.00 34 . 00
A comparison of the data for 1977-78 and the 
Siljander proposal shows increases in state aid as 
summarized in table 15.
Hypothesis 3 states that there is no significant
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TABLE 15
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-7 8 AND SILJANDER PROPOSAL FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST STATE 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 












(Highest) 1,555.70 2,039.90 484.20
Bridgman
(Lowest) 96 . 00 230.40 134.40
Range 1,459.70 1,809.50 349.80
difference in correlation between state aid per pupil to 
local school districts and state equalized valuation per 
pupil when there is a 60 percent reduction in the valua­
tion of residential, agricultural, and timber-cutover 
properties and state funds are provided to make up lost 
revenues. The correlation between the state aid per 
pupil and the S.E.V. per pupil under this plan yielded a 
coefficient of -.615, significant at the .001 level.
The results indicate a negative relationship and equaliz­
ing tendencies.
A test of the difference between correlation co­
efficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -3.4051. The z score was greater than -1.96; 
therefore there is a significant statistical change in
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the correlation under the Siljander proposal. Hypothesis 
3 was rejected at the .05 level. The difference between 
the correlations for the Siljander proposal and the 1977- 
78 finance methods produced an effect size of .15 which 
exceeded the criterion level of .14 and means that 15 
percent of the variance is accounted for by the differ­
ence between the 1977-78 data and the Siljander proposal. 
This difference is of practical significance inferring 
that adoption of the Siljander proposal would result in 
some reduction in the equalizing effects of state aid to 
Michigan schools.
Analysis 4— Siljander Variation A
The fourth analysis required a reduction in all 
agriculture, residential, and timber-cutover properties 
by 60 percent plus a reduction in industrial, commercial, 
and utility properties by 20 percent. Under variation A 
of the Siljander proposal, the school district with the 
lowest state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil was 
the Gwinn Area Community schools with $4,469.50, and 
the highest S.E.V. per pupil was the Bridgman Public 
Schools with $231,094.20, a difference of $226,624.70.
The Gwinn schools would receive $1,032.60 in state aid, 
and Bridgman would receive $687. Although the richest 
district in property wealth had more than fifty times 
as much S.E.V. per student as the lowest property-wealth 
district under this proposal, the richest district would 
receive almost two-thirds as much state aid as the
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TABLE 16
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS (IN  DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER











(Highest) 231,094.20 687.00 1,915.80 2,602.80
Gwinn
(Lowest) 4,469.50 1,032.60 98. 30 1,130.30
Range 226,624.70 345.60 1,817.50 1,472.50
poorest distr ict. These data are summarized in table 16.
The lowest amount of state aid would be paid
to the Forest Park School district which would receive
$530.70 based on S.E.V. of $30,061.10. The largest 
amount of state aid would be paid to Northville Public 
Schools which would receive $2,094.80 with S.E.V. of 
$18,209.90. This indicates that the range of state 
aid payments would be almost four times that of the low­
est state aid district. These data are summarized in 
table 17.
Table 18 summarizes the comparison of data for 
1977-78 and the Siljander variation A finance plan as 
it relates to the range of school districts with the 
highest and lowest state aid appropriations.
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TABLE 17
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE APPROPRIATIONS ( IN  DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE











(Highest) 2,094.80 16,535.90 542.40 2,636.40
Forest Park 
(Lowest) 530.70 30,061.10 739.50 1,269.50
Range 1,564.10 13,525.20 197.10 1,366.90
TABLE 18
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-7 8 AND SILJANDER VARIATION' A 
FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST STATE 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 













(Highest) 1,555.00 2 , 0°4.80 522.70
Forest Park
(Lowest) 84.00 530.70 446.30
Range 1,471.00 1,564.10 76.40
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Hypothesis 4 states that there is no significant 
difference in the correlation between state aid per 
pupil to local school districts and state equalized valua­
tion per pupil when there is a 60 percent reduction in the 
values of residential, agricultural, and timber-cutover 
properties, and a 20 percent reduction in commercial, 
industrial, and utility properties with state funds pro­
viding the lost revenues. A correlation made between the 
state apportionment per pupil under the Siljander varia­
tion A plan resulted in a correlation coefficient of -.487 
which was significant at the .001 level. The findings 
indicated a negative relationship and equalizing tendencies 
of the Siljander variation A plan.
A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -6.4063. The z score was greater than -1.96; 
therefore there is a significant statistical difference 
in the correlation under variation A of the Siljander 
plan. As a result, hypothesis 4 was rejected at the .05 
level. The difference between the correlations for the 
Siljander variation A proposal and the 1977-78 finance 
plan produced an effect size of .29 which exceeded the 
criterion level of .14. This means that 29 percent of 
the variance is accounted for by the difference between 
the 1977-78 data and the Siljander variation A proposal.
The findings are of practical significance, and adoption
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
of the Siljander variation A finance method would appear 
to result in considerable reduction in the equalizing 
effects of state aid to school districts in Michigan.
Analysis 5— Siljander Variation B
The fifth analysis called for a reduction in all 
agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover properties 
by 60 percent. The state would provide funds to make up 
for lost revenues. No payment would be made to a school 
district which would result in combined state and local 
aid greater than one-and-one-half times the total revenues 
of the school district with the lowest combined state and 
local revenue per pupil. The school district with the 
lowest combined state and local aid was Lake City Area 
Schools with $992.40. Therefore, no school district 
would receive state aid that would result in total 
revenues in excess of $1,488.60.
The highest and lowest school districts in terms 
of S.E.V. under variation B of the Siljander proposal 
were Bridgman and Gwinn, respectively. (See table 19).
All schools in the State of Michigan would con­
tinue to receive state aid under variation B of the 
Siljander proposal with the exception of eight schools 
which would receive no state aid; namely, Bridgman,
Covert, Dearborn City, Ecorse, Essexville, Flat Rock,
River Rouge, and Southfield. (See table 20).
The range of state aid appropriations between 
the richest and poorest schools was reduced from $1,55 5.7 0
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TABLE 19
DATA FOR SCHOOL D ISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AMD LOWEST
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS ( IN  DOLLARS) PER PU PIL  UNDER











(Highest) 286,170.10 . 00 2 , 372 . 30 2,372.30
Gwinn
(Lowest) 4,764.30 1,026.00 104.70 1,130.70
Range 281,405.80 1,026.00 2,267.60 1 ,242. 60
TABLE 20
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE 
SILJANDER VARIATION 3 FOR MICHIGAN K-12 SCHOOLS
State
School Appro­ Local Total
District priations S.E.V. Income Income
Rudyard (High) 1,309.40 8 ,722. 50 179.20 1,488.60
Bridgman (Low) . 00 286,170.10 2,372.30 2,372.30
Covert (Low) .00 68 ,220.00 1,642.70 1,642.70
Dearborn City . 00 53,150.40 1,589.20 1,589.20
Ecorse (Low) . 00 59,363.00 1,700.70 1,700.70
Essexville (Low) . 00 84 ,708.00 1,553.60 1,558.60
Flat Rock (Low) . no 61,274.60 1,623.80 1,623.80
River Rouge (Low) . 00 66,482.40 1,505.80 1,505.80
Southfield (Low) . 00 47,783.60 1,544.80 1,544.80
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in 1977-78 to $1,309.40 under variation A of the Siljander 
proposal. In addition, the range of total revenues between 
the richest and poorest was reduced from $1,632.70 in 
1977-78 to $1,379.90. This demonstrates the equalizing 
effects of state aid when a ceiling is placed on the 
eligible amount of aid in relation to the school district 
with the lowest total revenues.
Hypothesis 5 states that there is no significant 
difference in the correlation between state aid per 
pupil to local school districts and state equalized 
valuation per pupil when there is a 60 percent reduc­
tion in the values of residential, agricultural, and 
timber-cutover properties and the state provides funds 
to make up for lost revenues. However, no payment would 
be made to a school district which resulted in combined 
state and local aid greater than one-and-one-half times 
the total revenues of the school district with the lowest 
combined state and local aid per pupil. The correlation 
between the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per 
pupil and the state apportionment per pupil under this 
plan yielded a coefficient of -.718 which is significant 
at the .001 level. The coefficient indicates a strong 
negative relationship and therefore infers strong equal­
izing tendencies.
A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -0.3749. The z score was less than -1.96 which
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means there as not a significant statistical change in 
the correlation under the Siljander variation B plan. 
Hypqthesis 5 was retained. The difference between the 
correlations for the Siljander variation B and the 
1977-78 finance method produced an effect size of .016 
which was less than the criterion level of .14. The 
results are interpreted to mean that only 1.6 percent of 
the variance is accounted for by the difference between 
the 1977-78 data and the Siljander variation B proposal. 
There is no practical difference in znis finance plan 
insofar as the equalizing effects of state aid to school 
districts in Michigan is concerned.
Analysis G— Siljander Variation 3
The fifth variation required a reduction in all 
agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover properties 
by 60 percent. The state would provide funds to make up 
the lost revenues except no payment would be made to a 
school district which resulted in combined state and local 
income greater than two times the amount received by the 
school district with the lowest combined state and local 
aid per pupil. The school district with the lowest com­
bined state and local aid was Lake City Area schools with 
$992.40; therefore, no school district would receive 
state aid in excess of $1,984.80.
The highest and lowest school districts in terms 
of S.E.V. under variation C of the Siljander proposal are 
summarized in table 21.
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TABLE 21
DATA FOR SCHOOL D ISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE EQUALIZED VALUATIONS ( IN  DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER











(Highest) 286,170.10 oo 2,372.30 2,372.30
Gwinn
(Lowest) 4 ,764. 30 1,026.10 104.70 1,130.70
Range 281,405.80 1,026.10 2,267.60 1,242.60
All schools in the State of Michigan, except 
Bridgman, would receive increased state aid under the 
Siljander variation C method. The exception is explained 
by the fact that total aid to any school could not exceed 
one-and-one half times the lowest total revenue, or 
51,984.80. In 1977-78 Northville had $2,620.10 in 
combined state aid and local revenues. Using the varia­
tion C of the Siljander proposal, the largest amount of 
state aid Northville would be eligible to receive would 
be $1,387.50. These data are summarized in table 22.
A comparison of the state appropriation data for 
1977-78 and the Siljander variation C method is summarized 
in table 23.
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TABLE 22
DATA FOR SCHOOL D ISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE APPROPRIATIONS ( IN  DOLLARS) PER PUPIL UNDER THE











(Highest) 1,387.50 18,209.90 597.30 1,984.80
Bridgman
(Lowest) . 00 286,170.10 2,372.30 2,372.30
Range 1,387.50 267,960.20 1,775.00 386.20
TABLE 2 3
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-78 AND SILJANDER VARIATION C 
FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST STATE 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 
FOR MICHIGAN K-12 SCHOOLS
Decrease in 
Siljander State Aid 
School 1977-78 Var. C Under Sil-
District State Aid State Aid jander C
Northville
(Highest) 1,555.70 1,387.50 168.20
Bridgman
(Lowest) 96.00 . 00 96.00
Range 1,459.70 1,387.50 72.20
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Hypothesis 6 stated that there is no significant 
difference in correlation between state aid per pupil to 
the- local school district and state equalized valuation 
per pupil when there is a 60 percent reduction in the 
values of residential, agricultural, and timber-cutover 
properties and the state provides funds to make up for 
lost revenues except that no payment would be made to a 
school district which resulted in combined state and local 
aid greater than two times the amount received by the 
school district with the lowest amount of combined 
state and local revenues per pupil. The correlation 
between the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil 
and the state apportionment per pupil for the Siljander 
variation C method resulted in a coefficient of -.631, 
significant at the .001 level. A negative relationship 
was indicated; therefore it can be inferred chat the 
Siljander variation C finance method would result in 
equalizing tendencies of state aid to Michigan schools.
A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -1.5227. The z score was less than -1.96; 
therefore there is not a significant statistical differ­
ence using the Siljander variation C plan. Hypothesis 6 
was retained.- The difference between the correlations 
for the Siljander variation C and 1977-78 finance methods 
produced an effect size of .067 which was less than the 
criterion level of .14. Only 6.7 percent of the variance
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is accounted for by the difference between the 1977-78 
data and the Siljander C proposal; and there is no 
practical difference in this finance plan insofar as 
equalizing tendencies of state aid is concerned.
Analysis 7— Change in State Aid Formula
The seventh analysis proposed to change the 1977- 
78 state aid formula from $164 plus $40 per mill per 
pupil up to 30 mills to $164 plus $45 per mill per pupil 
up to 3 0 mills.
No changes would be seen in the S.E.V. when com­
paring 1977-78 data with the seventh proposal which 
specifies a slight increase in the state aid guarantee.
The school district with the largest state 
appropriation under analysis 7 would be the Northville 
Schools with $1,705. Seaver Island would receive no 
state aid. These data are summarized in table 24.
The state aid data for 1977-78 and the formula 
change effects resulting from analysis 7 are summarized 
and compared in cable 25.
Hypothesis 7 states that there is no significant 
difference in the correlation between state aid per 
pupil to the local school district and state equalized 
valuation per pupil when the state aid formula is changed 
from the 1977-78 formula of $164 plus $40 per mill per 
pupil up to 30 mills to a base of $164 plus $45 per mill 
per pupil up to 30 mills. The correlation between the
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TABLE 24
DATA FOR SCHOOL D ISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST
STATE APPROPRIATIONS ( IN  DOLLARS) PER PU PIL USING









(Highest) 1,705.00 32,472.50 1,065.10 2,770.10
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) 124,189.70 1,130.10 1,130.10
Range 1,705.00 91,717.20 65.00 1,640.00
TABLE 2 5
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 19 77-7 8 AND ANALYSIS 7 FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 






Formula in State Aid 
State Aid Formula Chg.
Northville
(Highest) 1,555.70 1,705.00 149.30
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) . 00 .00 .00
Range 1,555.70 1,705.00 149.30
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state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil and the 
state apportionment per pupil under this plan resulted in 
a correlation coefficient of -.743 which was significant 
at the .001 level. The coefficient indicates a negative 
relationship and equalizing tendencies of state aid to 
Michigan schools.
A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -0.4959. The z score was less than -1.96 
indicating that there is not a significant statistical 
difference in the correlation using the analysis 7 plan. 
Hypothesis 7 was retained. The difference between the 
correlations for analysis 7 and the 197 7-78 method 
produced an effect size of .02 which was less than the 
criterion level of .14. The results indicate that only 
2 percent of the variance is accounted for by the 
difference between the 1977-78 data and analysis 7.
There is no practical reason to change to this finance 
plan insofar as the equalizing effects of state aid are 
concerned.
Analysis 8--Removal of the Ceiling on Millage
The eighth analysis would remove the 30-mill 
ceiling for the state aid formula, and the state would 
guarantee $164 plus $40 per mill per student for all mills 
levied. No changes would result in the S.E.V. when com­
paring 1977-78 data with the suggested finance proposal 8.
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The school district with the highest state 
appropriation would be Northville Public Schools with 
$1,667, and Beaver Island Public Schools would be 
lowest with no state aid at all. These data are summa­
rized in table 26.
TABLE 26
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL USING 











(Highest) 1,667.00 32,472.50 1,065.10 2 ,732. 10
Beaver Island 
(Lowe s t ) 124,189.70 1,130.10 1,130.00
Range 1,667.00 120,942.20 65. 00 1,602.10
A comparison of the changes in state aid for 
1977-78 and finance proposal 8 is summarized in table 27.
Hypothesis 8 states that there is no signifi­
cant difference in the correlation between state aid per 
pupil to the local school district and state equalized 
valuation per pupil when the state aid formula is changed 
to remove the 30-mill ceiling and the state would 
guarantee S.E.V. of $164 plus $40 per mill per pupil 
for all mills levied. The correlation between the state 
equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per pupil and the state
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T A B L E  2 7
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-78 AND ANALYSIS 8 FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPII 









in Formula Chg. 
State Aid
Northville
(Highest) 1,555.70 1,667.00 111.30
Beaver Island 
(Lowest) .00 .00 . 00
Range 1,555.70 1,667.00 111.30
apportionment per pupil under this change in finance
formula resulted in a coefficient of -.699 , significant
at the .001 level of confidence. The results showed a 
negative relationship and indicated equalizing tendencies 
of state aid to Michigan schools using proposal 8.
A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -.9942. The z score was less than -1.96 so 
there is not a significant statistical change in the 
correlation under the eighth finance revision proposal. 
Hypothesis 8 was retained. The difference between the 
correlations for analysis 8 and the 1977-78 finance 
methods produced an effect size of .04 which was less than
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the criterion level of .14. The data infers that only 
4 percent of the variance is accounted for by the differ­
ence .between the 1977-78 data and analysis 8. There 
is no practical change in the equalizing effects of state 
aid when applying proposal 8 to 1977-78 data.
Analysis 9— Change in Formula and Ceiling Removal
The ninth analysis proposes to raise the member­
ship aid guarantee to $164 plus $45 per mill per pupil 
and remove the ceiling on mills allowable to qualify for 
state aid. No changes would result in the S.E.V. when 
comparing 1977-78 data with this finance method.
The school district with the highest state appro­
priation was the Northville Schools with $1,831, and the 
lowest school district was Beaver Island with no aid at 
all. These data are summarized in table 28.
TABLE 2 8
DATA FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL USING

















124 ,189.70 1,130.10 1,130.10
Range 1,831.00 91,717.20 65.00 1,766.00
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Table 29 summarizes a comparison of changes in 
data for 1977-70 and analysis 9 in relation to state aid 
to the highest and lowest school districts.
TABLE 29
COMPARISON OF DATA FOR 1977-7 8 AND ANALYSIS 9 FOR 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS WITH THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST 
STATE APPROPRIATIONS (IN DOLLARS) PER PUPIL 









in State Aid 
Formula Chg.
Northville
m \ghest) 1,555.70 1,831.00 325.30
Beaver Island
(Lowest) . 00 . 00 . 00
Hypothesis 9 states that there is no significant 
difference in correlation between state aid per pupil 
to local school districts and state equalized valuation 
per pupil when both the guaranteed base is raised from 
$164 plus $40 per mill to $164 plus $45 per mill per
pupil and the ceiling on mills is removed. The correla­
tion between the state equalized valuation (S.E.V.) per 
pupil and the state apportionment per pupil under this
plan resulted in a coefficient of -.722 which is signifi­
cant at the .001 level of confidence. The findings 
indicate a negative relationship which infers equalizing 
tendencies of state aid to Michigan schools.
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A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples produced a z 
score of -0.2399. The z score was less than -1.96; 
therefore there is not a significant statistical differ­
ence in the correlation under the ninth finance revision 
proposal. Hypothesis 9 was retained. The difference 
between the correlations for analysis 9 and the 1977-78 
method produced an effect size of .01 which was less 
than the criterion level of .14. Therefore, only 1 per­
cent of the variance is accounted for by the difference 
between the 1977-78 data and analysis 9. There is no 
practical change in the equalizing effects of state aid 
when applying proposal 8 to 1977-78 data. It appears 
that raising the state aid guarantee slightly and re­
moving the ceiling on the number of eligible mills does 
not produce any better equalizing results from state 
aid than the 1977-78 formula.
A summary of the results of all nine finance 
proposals is given in table 30. The Tisch and Siljander 
finance revision proposals as well as analyses 2 and 4 
were statistically significant at the .05 level. The 
findings of this study infer that the difference in 
results produced by the Tisch and Siljander proposals and 
variations 2 and 4 are reliable and that there are only 
five chances in one hundred that this trust is in error. 
Furthermore, these four analyses appear to have practical 
significance. The results suggest that these finance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
methods would produce real changes if adopted, changes 
that would reduce the equalizing effects of state aid 
to Michigan schools when compared to 1977-7 8 data.
Analyses 5 through 9 were not found to be 
statistically different from 1977-78 and if adopted would 
not significantly change the equalizing effects of state 
aid in the State of Michigan.
Table 31 (appendix B) is a summary of the range 
in differences in dollars per pupil for state equalized 
valuations, state aid, local revenues, and total revenues 
for all nine proposals under investigation in this study. 
Comparison may be made with the 1977-78 data to determine 
the effects of each proposed finance revision.
Throughout the analysis of each finance proposal 
several school districts were named as highest or lowest 
in various categories. Tables 32 through 37 (appendix 
B) are summaries of this data for individual school 
systems mentioned in this study.
Summary
Chapter IV presented the data collected for 
530 K-12 school districts in Michigan and analyzed it 
in terms of nine finance revision proposals. To identify 
inequities, the highest and lowest school districts were 
determined for each of the nine finance revision plans 
on the basis of state equalized valuations, state 
appropriations, and total revenue per pupil. In addition


















SUfMARY OK FINANCE REVISION PROIOSAIjS (XJMl'ARIU WITH 1977-78 DATA
r tor
Analysis Proposal Procedure Proixisal r^
1 Tisch 50 percent reduction all -.326** .1062
real property
2 Tisch Var. 60 percent reduction all
real property -.137* .0187
3 Siljander 60 iJercent reduction all -.615** .378
ayric., residential, and
timber cutover property
4 Siljander 60 lercent reduct, all ay. -.487** .2371
Var. A resid.,6 timber cutover
plus 20 percent reduct.
indust, and utility
5 Siljander 60 [jercent reducl. all ay. -.718** .5155
Var. U resid., u tinier; no aid
noru Ulan 1.5 x lowest dist.
6 Siljander 60 percent roduct. all ug. -.681** .4637
Var. C resid., 4. timber; no aid
nore U u n  2 x lowest dist.
7 Formula State guarantees $164 plus -.743** .5520
Variation $45/mill/pupi1 to 30/mills
8 Formula State guarantees $164 plus -.698** .4886
Variation $40/null/pui)i 1 ;no ceiling
9 Formula $164 plus $45/mi 11/pupil -.722** .5212
Variation all mills— no ceiling
1877-78 base Year 6 formula -.729 .5314
























* P < .01 
** P • .001 
Q gacuna > .14
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a comparison was made between the 197 7-78 data and each 
of the nine proposals.
The relationship between state equalized valuation 
and state apportionment per pupil was shown by a Pearson 
product-moment-correlation coefficient for each of the 
nine proposals to determine equalizing tendencies of 
state aid. A test of the difference between correlation 
coefficients from two independent samples was also 
performed for each proposal as compared to 1977-78 data 
to determine the statistical significance. Each finance 
proposal was also evaluated in terms of its effect size to 
determine practical significance.
It was found that the Tisch and Siljander pro­
posals and variations 2 and 4 had both statistical and 
practical significance. It appears that these four 
finance plans would significantly reduce the equalizing 
effects of state aid to Michigan schools.
Finance proposals 5 through 9 were additional 
variations of Siljander's method, slight increases in 
amount of guaranteed membership aid, and/or removal of 
the ceiling of eligible mills for state aid. These five 
variations in finance plans were found to result in no 
statistically significant changes from the 1977-78 
method. It could be concluded that no changes in equaliz­
ing effects of state aid would be experienced with the use 
of one of these five proposals.
No improvement in equalizing tendencies of state
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aid would be realized by adoption of any of the nine 
finance revision plans analyzed; namely, the Tisch 
proposal and one variation thereof; the Siljander pro­
posal and three variations thereof; and three changes 
to the state aid formula.
In chapter V conclusions will be drawn from the 
data presented. Recommendations will be made and 
suggestions for further study will be outlined.
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C H A P T E R  V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter V presents a summary of the study along 
with a discussion of the applications of the findings of 
the study. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations
for further study are made.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine what
effect selected tax reform and school finance proposals
would have on the equalizing tendencies of state aid to 
Michigan public school districts. Taxpayers in Michigan 
reflected the mood of the nation in 1978 with active 
efforts to reduce property taxes. Three proposals to 
amend the state constitution in Michigan were placed on 
the November 1978 ballot. These proposals were expected 
to reduce or shift property taxes and at the same time 
change the financing of education.
First, the Michigan voters were presented with a 
voucher plan which would have prohibited the levy of 
property taxes for educational purposes. A system of 
general state taxation would have supported all elementary 
and secondary education with the issuance of "vouchers"
113
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which could be used at either public or private schools 
of the student's choice.
Secondly, the Tisch proposal called for a sharp 
roll-back in property taxes, limited increases in 
property assessments to no more than 2.5 percent per year, 
and limited the state income tax rate. This proposal was 
seen as a "tax-shift" since provisions were included 
for revenue make-up by other means.
Thirdly, the Headlee Tax Limitation proposal 
limited the total amount of state and local taxes that 
could be collected from the public to a fixed proportion 
of the Michigan personal income. As personal income 
increases, tax revenues could increase. The Headlee 
proposal also required the state to pay the cost of 
any new mandated programs and required that future bond 
obligations be approved by the electors.
In addition, Mark Siljander, State Representative 
of the 42nd District in Michigan, introduced a resolution 
to the Legislature calling for a constitutional amend­
ment to reduce certain classifications of property and to 
limit assessment increases for all property taxes to 
7 percent a year. Siljander's amendment would have 
guaranteed a minimum amount of state aid per pupil and 
would have reduced reliance on property taxes. Any losses 
to local governments and school districts would be made up 
from income taxes and lottery monies under Siljander's 
proposal.
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Confusion existed as to what would happen if 
one or all of the proposals should be approved by the 
voters. Nevertheless, the Headlee Tax Amendment was 
passed by a close margin, and an unexpectedly long and 
difficult process began tc interpret what this new 
amendment meant to citizens in Michigan in terms of 
educational and governmental services. As of April 
1979, this uncertainty of interpretation of the Headlee 
Amendment by the Legislature still existed, and sponsors 
of other finance-revision proposals began to prepare for 
the reintroduction of their propositions to the voters.
The evolution of the educational process in the 
United States has progressed from the privilege of 
private schools for the advantaged, to the privilege of 
public schools for all at public expense, and finally to 
a right that must be provided for all equally without 
regard for race, sex, ability, or wealth. Whereas 
"equal educational opportunity” was first seen as a 
question of race with integration a possible solution, 
equity for students in the 1970s became a question of 
correcting the imbalance in funding for rich and poor 
schools. Still impeding the attainment of this goal, 
however, is the lack of agreement as to the definition 
of "equal educational opportunity." Major philosophical 
concepts of equality of educational opportunity have 
been contributed by Wise (1968) whose nine definitions 
are all based on allocation of resources from differing
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perspectives of the issue; by Levin. (1974) who 
advocates compensatory funds for the disadvantaged so 
that all children have an equal start in life; and by 
Coleman's (1974) emphasis on the "effects" or outcomes 
of schools rather than the resource imputs.
The legal interpretations the courts have given 
as to what is and what is not equal educational opportu­
nity have had far-reaching and important implications. 
Half of the states enacted school finance reforms 
following the Serrano (1971) decision wherein the 
California Supreme Court ruled that the quality of a 
child's education could not be dependent upon the wealth 
of his or her parents or on the wealth of the district in 
which he lived. The primary goal of the finance reforms 
was to implement formulas which would distribute more 
state aid to school districts low in property wealth and 
therefore low in ability to provide educational programs 
on a par wich wealthier districts.
The intensified emphasis on financial equity led 
researchers to launch extensive studies to determine 
which finance methods were most equalizing and to 
ascertain to what extent the various formulas were 
accomplishing the goal of equalization. Investigative 
activities ranged from efforts to identify determinants 
of local school district tax and expenditure policies to 
studies encompassing a small number of states, and 
finally to massive undertakings which included all 50
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states. The results of such research contributed to a 
pool of knowledge which was necessary and helpful, but 
numerous additional questions were also raised.
The Michigan system of school finance adopted in 
197 3 was a plan known as an "equal yield formula" and 
provided that school districts should receive equal 
dollars per pupil for equal millage effort. Schools are 
financed by (1) locally levied property taxes, a portion 
of which are voted by the property owners, and (2) state 
aid based on the amount of property value (state equalized 
valuation) and millage, the rate at which that property 
value is taxed.
The purpose of state membership aid to Michigan 
schools is to assist those districts which cannot raise 
enough funds locally to provide a desired level of 
educational services comparable to wealthier school 
districts selecting the same tax rate. If implementa­
tion of one or more of the proposals under study results 
in rich schools receiving more state aid than poor 
schools, the desired equalizing quality of state aid 
becomes diminished. By holding the total revenues con­
stant at the 1977-78 level, it is possible to evaluate 
the equalizing or disequalizing effects which would 
occur with any given proposal.
This study sought to simulate the results which 
might be experienced in Michigan should the Tisch or 
Siljander proposals be adopted, or if a variation of one
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of these plans were implemented. Likewise, three possible 
changes in the state aid formula were examined as alter­
natives to the Tisch and Siljander proposals.
The data required for this study included (1) all 
real property values in the State of Michigan by school 
district and (2) enrollment, revenue, and expenditure 
data for 530 K-12 school districts representing 99.8 
percent of all public school students in these grades.
The relationship between state equalized valuations of 
property and state aid per pupil was determined by com­
puting a Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient.
A negative correlation indicated equalizing tendencies 
while a positive correlation would have indicated dis- 
equaiizing tendencies.
The 1977-78 Michigan finance formula produced a 
correlation coefficient of -.729 between state equalized 
valuations and state aid per pupil indicating a negative 
relationship and therefore an equalizing tendency. The 
1977-78 coefficient (-.729) was used as the base for 
comparison for all finance revision proposals under 
consideration in this study. Coefficients were computed 
for each of the nine proposals being investigated to 
determine equalizing tendencies. A test of the difference 
between correlation coefficients from two independent 
samples was performed to compare the results of each 
analysis with the 1977-78 data to determine statistically 
significant differences. A power analysis of each
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proposal was undertaken to determine effect size and 
practical significance. Power was set at .95, alpha at 
.05., and effect size or gamma at .14.
The first analysis dealt with the Tisch proposal 
which would reduce all real property valuations by 5 0 
percent. The correlation between state equalized valua­
tion per pupil and state aid per pupil produced a co­
efficient of -.326 for the Tisch proposal, indicating a 
negative relationship and equalizing tendency. A test 
of the difference between the Tisch coefficient (-.329) 
and the 1177-78 coefficient (-.729) was found to be 
statistically significant beyond the .05 level. The 
effect size for the Tisch proposal was computed to be .42, 
which indicated practical as well as statistical signif­
icance. The Tisch proposal would cut local property 
taxes in half. However, if the same level of total 
educational dollars were to be maintained as that avail­
able in 1977-73, richer school districts would need larger 
state aid payments than poor districts to compensate for 
greater loss in local monies. Educational inequities 
would thus be increased. If at the same time, the Tisch 
proposal limited the increase permissible for taxes of 
all kinds, it might be difficult to produce adequate 
funding at the state level to make up for lost local tax 
dollars necessary to support the 1977-78 level of total 
educational dollars. The Tisch proposal, if adopted, 
would therefore significantly reduce the equalizing effects
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of state aid to Michigan schools.
The second analysis was a variation of the Tisch 
proposal and specified that the valuation of all real 
property would be reduced by 60 percent. The correlation 
between state equalized valuation per pupil and state aid 
per pupil produced a coefficient of -.137 for this 
variation of the Tisch proposal, indicating a negative 
relationship and an equalizing tendency. A test of the 
difference between the Tisch variation coefficient (-.137) 
and the 1977-78 coefficient (-.729) indicated that the 
difference was statistically significant beyond the .05 
level. The effect size for the Tisch variation was com­
puted to be .51 which indicated practical as well as 
statistical significance. Adoption of this variation of 
the Tisch proposal would result in the lowest property 
taxes of any of the nine finance proposals included in 
this investigation. At the same time, che largest state 
aid payments would be required under this plan. Richer 
school districts would need larger state aid payments 
than poorer districts to compensate for the greater loss 
in local monies if the 1977-78 level of total revenues 
were to be maintained. If adequate funding were not 
available at the state level because of the Tisch require­
ment limiting the increase on taxes of all kinds, the 
alternative would be to reduce educational spending.
This variation of the Tisch proposal would result in 
greater inequities overall than any of the other finance
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revision plans under investigation in this study.
The third analysis was the Siljander proposal 
which required a 60 percent reduction in the valuation 
of all agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover 
properties. The valuation of commercial, industrial, 
and utility properties would not be reduced. The corre­
lation between state equalized valuation per pupil and 
state aid per pupil produced a correlation coefficient of 
-.615, indicating a negative relationship and an 
equalizing tendency. A test of the difference between 
the Siljander coefficient (-.615) and the 1977- 
78 coefficient (-.729) was found to be statistically 
significant beyond the .05 level. The effect size for 
the Siljander proposal was computed to be .15, which 
indicated practical as well as statistical significance.
The Siljander coefficient of -.615 suggests that 
the reduction in equalizing tendencies of state aid 
under this finance proposal would not be as severe as 
either of the Tisch proposals analyzed. Compared with 
the 1977-78 finance plan, however, some increase in 
inequities would occur inasmuch as wealthy scnool dis­
tricts would experience a larger increase in state aid 
than poor school districts. The overall effect of 
adoption of the Siljander proposal would be a reduction 
in the equalizing effects of state aid to Michigan 
schools when compared to 1977-78.
The fourth analysis was variation A of the
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Siljander proposal which called for a 60 percent reduc­
tion in all agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover 
properties and a 20 percent reduction in industrial, 
commercial, and utility properties. The correlation 
between state equalized valuation per pupil and state aid 
per pupil produced a coefficient of -.487, indicating a 
negative relationship and an equalizing tendency. A 
test of the difference between the coefficient in this 
plan (-.487) and the 1977-78 coefficient (-.729) was 
found to be statistically significant beyond the .05 
level. The effect size for the Siljander variation A 
proposal was computed to be .29, indicating practical as 
well as statistical significance. The Siljander variation 
A coefficient and effect size suggest that -his finance 
plan would be preferable to either of the Tisch proposals; 
however, variation A would be less satisfactory in terms 
of equalization than the original Siljander proposal. 
Compared to 1977-78 data, variation A of the Siljander 
proposal would result in a reduction in the equalizing 
effects of state aid to Michigan schools. 3usiness and 
industrial property owners in Michigan might be better 
satisfied with Siljander variation A since they, too, would 
receive property tax reductions under this plan.
The fifth analysis was variation B of the Siljander 
proposal which called for a 60 percent reduction in the 
valuation of all agricultural, residential, and timber- 
cutover properties with the provision that no school
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district could receive state aid which would result in 
total revenues in excess of one-and-one-half times the 
school district with the lowest total revenues. The 
correlation between state equalized valuation per pupil 
and state aid per pupil produced a coefficient of -.718, 
indicating a negative relationship and an equalizing 
tendency. A test of the difference between the Siljander 
B coefficient (-.718) and the 1977-78 coefficient (-.729) 
was not statistically significant. These findings 
indicate that adoption of the Siljander variation B 
proposal would result in no significant changes in the 
equalizing effects of state aid. This plan could be 
substituted for the 1977-7 8 finance scheme without 
significantly changing the equalizing tendencies if there 
were other features which made the Siljander variation 3 
plan preferable, such as property tax reduction. The 
range of differences in total revenues between rich and 
poor schools is the smallest of the nine proposals when 
using the Siljander variation B method of financing 
schools.
Taxpayers would find their property taxes reduced 
from the 1977-78 levels for agricultural, residential, 
and timber-cutover properties under the Siljander varia­
tion B proposal. However, negative factors such as no tax 
relief for commercial and industrial property owners, 
reduction of taxes for non-Michigan residents, and other 
political and economic considerations would have to be
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evaluated prior to recommendation of the Siljander varia­
tion B proposal.
The sixth analysis was variation C of the Siljander 
proposal which called for a 60 percent reduction in all 
agricultural, residential, and timber-cutover properties, 
with the provision that no school district could receive 
state aid which would result in total revenues in excess 
of two times the school district with the lowest total 
revenues. The correlation between state equalized 
valuation per pupil and state aid per pupil produced a 
coefficient of -.681, indicating a negative relationship 
and an equalizing tendency. A test of the difference 
between the Siljander C coefficient (-.681) and the 1977- 
78 coefficient (-.729) was not statistically significant:. 
This means chat adoption of the Siljander variation C 
proposal would result in no significant changes in the 
equalizing effects of state aid. This plan could be 
substituted for the 1977-78 finance plan without signifi­
cantly changing the equalizing tendencies of state aid 
in Michigan if there were other features which made the 
Siljander variation C plan preferable. Any negative 
and/or economic considerations such as those cited for 
variation B would have to be evaluated with respect to 
variation C of the Siljander proposal prior to a recommen­
dation for adoption of this proposal.
The first six proposals analyzed in this study 
were in reality tax shifts rather than plans for actual
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reduction in taxes of all kinds. The two major alterna­
tives to the property tax are sales and income taxes.
Voter acceptance and attitudes toward the type of tax 
levied must also be considered. It is apparent that the 
present property tax situation is not popular with the 
general public.
A shift from property taxes to sales taxes might 
be seen as undesirable since sales taxes tend to be 
regressive. Sales taxes tend to tax people for minimum 
essentials and therefore require a larger proportion of 
income from poor people than rich people thus increasing 
disparities. Michigan's present 4 percent sales tax 
exempts food items and medicine. Sales taxes have little 
relationship to ability to pay or benefits received. On 
the other hand, a shift to sales taxes might be seen as 
beneficial to Michigan residents because of che heavy 
out-of-state tourist industry.
A shift from property taxes to the state income 
tax would not improve equity for taxpayers because the 
income tax in Michigan is a flat rate rather than a 
progressive tax. A shift to the state income tax would 
result in poor people paying the same proportion of 
their total income as rich people; however, poor people 
would have to pay a proportionately larger share of their 
discretionary income in taxes which would perpetuate or 
increase existing disparities. Income taxes may be viewed 
as more closely related to benefits received and ability
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to pay than property taxes. A shift to income taxes would 
likely result in increased taxes for those presently 
benefitting from the circuit-breaker provision. Out-of- 
state, non-resident property owners might escape alterna­
tive tax schemes unless some provision is designed for 
this purpose. Administrative problems and costs in 
maintaining a dual system of property tax assessment for 
residents and non-residents could prove burdensome.
The Siljander proposal requirement to reduce the 
value of some classes of property (agricultural, residen­
tial, and timber-cutover) might precipitate some political 
and economic ramifications and resentment from owners of 
commercial, industrial, and utility properties who would 
not experience equivalent property tax relief. At the 
same time, all taxpayers would be required to pay increased 
alternative taxes such as sales or income taxes if the 
1977-78 level of total educational dollars were to be 
maintained.
If property tax reduction is implemented, the 
state government may be expected to take on a larger share 
of the burden in providing educational dollars. Taxpayers 
might find the alternative taxes required to meet the need 
for larger state aid payments to schools could become as 
troublesome as real property taxes. There are those who 
also fear loss of local control in the schools with an 
increase in state responsibility for funding.
The seventh analysis was a change in the state
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aid formula and would provide aid to school districts of 
$164 plus $45 per mill per pupil up to 30 mills. This 
is a $5 per mill increase from the 1977-78 formula.
The correlation between state equalized valuation per 
pupil and state aid per pupil produced a coefficient of 
-.743, the largest coefficient of all nine proposals 
under study. The coefficient from this plan indicated a 
strong negative relationship between state equalized 
valuation and state aid and therefore indicated a 
strong equalizing tendency. A test of the difference 
between the analysis 7 coefficient (-.743) and the 
1977-78 coefficient (-.729) was not statistically 
significant. This means that adoption of the analysis 7 
finance plan would result in no significant changes in 
the equalizing effects of state aid. A higher guarantee 
per mill is a higher reward for effort and might encourage 
more local effort, however.
The eighth analysis called for the removal of 
the current ceiling of 30 mills on the number of mills 
eligible for state monies. The correlation between state 
equalized valuation per pupil and state aid per pupil 
produced a coefficient of -.699 indicating a negative 
relationship and an equalizing tendency. A test of the 
difference between the analysis 8 coefficient (-.699) and 
the 1977-78 coefficient (-.729) was not statistically 
significant. Removal of the ceiling on mills did not 
improve the equalizing tendencies. Adoption of analysis 8
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would result in no significant changes in the equalizing 
effects of state aid to Michigan schools.
The ninth analysis called for a raise in the 
amount of guaranteed aid to $164 plus $45 per mill per 
pupil and removal of the ceiling on mills eligible for 
aid. The correlation between state equalized valuation 
per pupil and state aid per pupil produced a coefficient 
of -.722, which indicated a negative relationship and an 
equalizing tendency. A test of the difference between 
the analysis 9 coefficient (-.722) and the 1977-78 
coefficient (-.729) was not statistically significant. 
Adoption of analysis 9 would result in no significant 
changes in the equalizing effects of state aid to Michigan 
schools.
In the 7th, 8th, and 9th analyses there were no 
changes in local revenues, that is, no reduction or 
increases in property taxes. There were some increases 
in state aid, particularly with the 7th and 9th analyses. 
Funding to provide for these increases would have to be 
produced from an alternative source. It may be assumed 
that taxpayers would react negatively to any increase in 
taxes at a time when the present tax load is perceived 
as burdensome.
It may be expected that efforts will continue to 
be made in the search for relief for taxpayers and in the 
attempt to achieve dollar equity for students by closing 
the revenue gaps between rich and poor schools. Finance
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reform is not a one-time project. The multi-dimensional 
and increasingly complex issues encompassing any decision 
with regard to public policy, such as school finance, have 
attracted a broad spectrum of participants in their 
resolution. Taxpayers have demonstrated their willingness 
to seek relief directly at the polls thus bypassing the 
legislative process. If Michigan residents are to enjoy 
the benefits of a truly equitable system of educational 
finance, all possible efforts should be made to obtain 
information in advance of adoption of any reform. The 
experience of recent months wherein the Legislature has 
labored long to interpret the meaning of the Headlee 
Amendment which was passed last November is an example 
of the lack of understanding before an amendment was 
introduced and passed.
This study has attempted to provide advance 
notice of the possible damage to the equalizing ten­
dencies of state aid which could result with the adop­
tion of the original Tisch or Siljander proposals. Both 
the Tisch and Siljander proposals are still pending; 
therefore, there is now sufficient information avail­
able to indicate that if property taxes are reduced 
as specified in one of these plans, significant damage 
would result to the equalizing tendencies of state aid 
with the adoption of one of these proposals. It was 
demonstrated, however, that placing a ceiling on the 
state aid (as was done in the variations B and C of the
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state aid (as was done in the variations B and C of the 
Siljander proposal)can effectively reduce property taxes 
and maintain the same equalization effects of state aid 
as was present in 1977-78. School finance authorities 
can see that slight changes in the state aid formula 
will not result in any significant improvemement in the 
equalization of educational opportunity but these slight 
changes will cost more money. The information provided 
in this study highlights the importance and value of 
simulation studies prior to the adoption and implemen­
tation of major policy changes, such as school finance.
At first sight the changes may seem politically signifi­
cant but they may possibly result in undesired and 
unexpected damage in other respects.
Conclusions
The following conclusions are based on the 
analysis of data obtained from a computer simulation of 
the 1977-78 school finance data using 530 K-12 school 
districts and property valuations in the State of 
Michigan:
1. Plans to reduce property taxes and make 
up for lost revenues by state sources decrease the 
equalizing effects of state aid except that shifts 
away from the property tax to other state revenues can 
be carried out without damage to the equalizing tendencies 
of state aid if there is a ceiling on the amount of state
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aid that is available to a local school district. It 
appears that the larger the reduction in assessed valua­
tions, the more damage that is done insofar as equalizing 
tendencies of state aid is concerned.
2. Slightly increasing the amount of state aid 
guaranteed in an equal yield formula does not improve 
the equalizing tendencies of state aid.
3. Removing the ceiling on the number of mills 
eligible for state aid in a guaranteed equal yield formula 
does not result in improved equalization.
4. Computer simulations are essential in 
providing the necessary information for decision making.
Recommendations
Further studies should be made:
1. to determine the equalizing effects of state 
aid as a result of the Headlee amendment to the Michigan 
State Constitution which was passed by the voters in 1978
2. to determine the equalizing effects of large 
increases in the guaranteed equal yield formula
3. to determine the equalizing effects when a 
ceiling is applied to the state aid under the Tisch 
proposal
4. to determine the cause of the crease in 
equalization between state equalized valuation and state 
aid in Michigan between the years 1972-73 through 1977-78
5. to determine the total costs to the state of
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each of the proposals studied herein.
It is recommended that a replication of this 
study be carried out using 1978 personal income data as 
a measure of school district wealth.
It is recommended that other finance revision 
proposals which may be presented for consideration be 
submitted to computer simulation prior to adoption and 
implementation.
It is recommended that a search should be made 
for other formulae which would increase equalization.
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON OF FINANCE REVISION PROPOSALS
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BEAVER ISLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE PROPOSAL DATA








1977-78 124,189.70 1,130. 10 .00 1,130.10
Tisch 62,094.90 565.00 565.00 1,130.00
Tisch Var. 49,675.90 452.10 678.00 1,130. 10
Siljander 57,089.20 519.50 612.00 1,131.50
Siljander A 54,645.50 497.30 634.00 1,131.20
Siljander B 57,089.20 519.50 612.00 1,131.50
Siljander C 57,089.20 519.50 612.00 1,131.50
A nalysis 7 124,139.70 1,130.10 .00 1,130. 10
Analysis 3 124,189.70 1,130.10 .00 1,130.10
Analysis 9 124,189.70 1,130.10 .00 1,130.10
T A B L E  3 3
BRIDGMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE PROPOSAL DATA 








1977-78 301,413.00 2,493.70 96.00 2,594.70
Tisch 150,706.50 1,249.40 1,345.00 2,594.40
Tisch Var. 120,565.10 999.50 1,595.40 2,594.90
S iljander 286,170.10 2,372.30 230.40 2,502.70
Siljander A 231,094.20 1,915.80 687.00 2,602.80
S iljander B 286,170.10 2,372.30 .00 2 - 372. 30
S iljander C 286,170.10 2,372.30 .00 2,372.30
Analysis 7 301,413.00 2,498.70 96.00 2,594.70
Analysis 8 301,413.00 2,498.70 96.00 2,594.70
Analysis 9 301,413.00 2,498.70 96.00 2,594.70
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TABLE 34
FOREST PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE PROPOSAL DATA








1977-78 48 ,203 . 5(1 1,185.30 34 .00 1,269.30
Tisch 24,101.70 592.90 677.00 1,269.90
Tisch Var. 19,281.40 474.30 795.00 1,269.30
Siljander 35,451.00 372.10 398.00 1,270.10
Siljander A 30,061.10 738.50 530.70 1,269.20
Siljander 3 35,451.00 372. 10 398.00 1.270.10
Siljander C 35,451.00 372.10 398 . 00 1 ,270. 10
Analysis 7 48 ,203 . 50 1,135.30 169.00 1,354.30
Analysis 3 48,203.50 1,135.30 34 . 00 1,269.30
Analysis 9 48,203.50 1,135.30 169.00 1,354.30
GWINN
TABLE 35
PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE : 





Proposal S.E.V. Income Aid Income
1977-73 9,671.20 212.60 917.00 1,129.60
Tisch 4,835.60 106.30 1,023.00 1,129.30
Tisch Var. 3,868.40 35. 10 1,045.20 1,130 . j 0
Siljander 4,764.30 104.70 1,026.10 1,130.30
Siljander A 4,469.50 98.30 1 , U 32.60 1,130.90
Siljander B 4,764.30 104.70 1,026.00 1,130.70
S iljander C 4,764.30 104.70 1, 026. 10 1,130.30
Analysis 7 9,671.10 212.60 1,027.00 1,239.60
Analysis 8 9,671.10 212.60 917.00 1,129.60
Analysis 9 9,671.10 212.60 1,027.00 1.239.60
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TABLF. 3G
LAKE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE PROPOSAL DATA








1977-78 37,336.90 709.40 278.00 987.40
Tisch 18,668. 40 354.70 633.00 987.70
Tisch Var. 14,934.70 283.80 704.00 9 8 7 . SO
Siljander 18,209.90 349.40 543.00 992.40
Siljander A 16,535.90 328.10 664.00 992. 10
Siljander B 18,387.90 349.40 543.00 992.40
Siljander C 18,387.90 349.40 643.00 992.40
Analysis 7 37,336.80 709.40 373.00 1 ,032 . 40
Analysis 3 37,336.30 709.40 278.00 987 . 40
Analysis 9 37,336.80 709 . 40 373.00 1,082.40
NORTHVILLE
T A B L E  37
PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCE PROPOSAL 
IN D O L L A R S  PER PUPIL
DATA
Local State Total
Proposal S.E.V. Income Aid Income
1977-78 32,472.60 1 ,065. 10 1, 555 .00 2,620.10
Tisch 16,236.30 532.60 2,088.00 2 , 520 . 50
Tisch Var. 12,989.00 426.00 2,194.00 2,620.00
Siljander 18,209.90 597.30 2,039.00 2,536.30
Siljander A 16,535.90 542.40 2,094.00 2 , 636 .40
Siljander B 18,209.90 597.30 391.31 1,483.61*
Siljander C 18,209.90 597.30 1,387.50 1 ,984 .30*’
Analysis 7 32,472.50 1,065.10 1,705.00 2,770. 10
Analysis 8 32.472.50 1,065.10 1,667.00 2 , 732 . 10
Analysis 9 32,472.50 1,065.10 1,831.00 2,896. 10
•Total income limited t o -one-and-one-ha 1f times lowest 
district to be e l i g i b l e  for state aid 
••Total income limited to two times lowest district 
to be eligible for s t a t e  aid
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